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politikk er også presentert. Tre dimensjoner som kan 
brukes til å vurdere grad av klimaambisjoner 
presenteres: Marked, Minimere samfunnskostnader og 
Teknologisk Utvikling.  Hver dimensjon består av 
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Market, Minimizing Societal Costs, and Technology 
Development. The climate policy portfolios of the six 
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three sets of specific criteria. Four climate policy areas are 
examined: emissions-reductions targets, emissions 
regulations, renewable energy policies and energy-
efficiency policies. Applying different criteria for 
measuring level of ambition results in radically different 
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Norway is best as regards minimizing the social costs 
while Sweden ranks highest on the market dimension. 
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1 Introduction1 
Many European governments present their countries as climate policy leaders and models for 
others. Norway argues that the national climate policy is among the most ambitious in the 
world, Denmark claims that it is a success example, Germany asserts that its ‘Energiewende’ 
can show the way for energy transformation in the whole of Europe, and the UK presents its 
Climate Law as a model for climate governance. However, others may not always agree with 
policymakers’ flattering descriptions of their own achievements. This report explores and 
discusses the ambitiousness of national climate policy of six European countries, asking: how 
and to what extent are the climate policies of these six countries ambitious?  
Opinions about ambitiousness in climate policy vary across countries, professions, political 
parties and societal groups. National climate policy is a relatively new issue for political 
scientists and no strong comparative tradition exists. Thus far, single case studies dominate, 
and they have few commonalities when it comes to how climate policy is categorized and 
measured in terms of ambitiousness. It is hardly possible to develop one list of criteria for 
judging ambitiousness that can achieve widespread acceptance. Instead, this report develops 
three dimensions of ambitiousness, and ranks the policy portfolios of Denmark, France, 
Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK. These countries have developed a whole range of 
climate measures, and we find commonalities as well as differences. All countries are members 
of the European Union (EU) and/or the European Economic Area (EEA) and are thus 
required to implement the EU’s climate regulations and directives.  The relevance of new EU 
policies will be assessed in relation to the EEA agreement, and thus far close to all EU climate 
policies are have been included in the EEA agreement. This report gives an overview of EU 
climate policy, but since the EU influences most national policies, it does not make sense to 
compare the ambitiousness of EU and national policies systematically. 
Due to resource constraints, it is not possible to provide in-depth descriptions of the full array 
of the national climate-policy measures. Instead, this report focuses on some core aspects of 
climate mitigation: climate-policy objectives, emissions regulations, renewable energy policy, 
and energy-efficiency policy. If climate adaptation, carbon capture and storage (CCS), sectors 
1 This paper has been prepared at CICERO’s in response to a project commissioned by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of the Ministry of Finance. Civil servants in the 
ministry, particularly Marte Sollie, have provided valuable input to the report. Many colleagues at 
CICERO have also provided important feedback: warm thanks to Knut Alfsen, Steffen Kallbekken, 
Thorvald Moe and Arild Underdal. Any errors and misinterpretations are mine alone. 
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such as transport, waste, agriculture or land use had been included, the conclusions might well 
have been different.  
This report takes stock of the climate policy situation at the entrance to 2013,  and does not 
assess how previous climate policies have affected today’s emission levels. The mapping of the 
climate policies is based on extensive consultation of various documents, particularly national 
reports submitted to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
national reports to the EU on energy efficiency and renewable energy, parliamentary reports 
available in English, and political science books and articles.  
This report will first take stock of relevant political science research and specify three 
dimensions of ambitiousness. Then follows background information about the six countries, 
before their climate policy portfolios are described, issue-area by issue-area. Fourth, the 
countries are compared; similarities and differences are assessed and discussed, and finally 
some conclusions are offered. 
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1.1 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations  
 
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage 
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
COP Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC) 
EEA  European Environment Agency 
EPBD Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 
ETS Emissions Trading System 
EU European Union 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GHG Greenhouse Gases 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JI Joint Implementation (UNFCCC) 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OSPAR Oslo and Paris Conventions 
TwH Terawatt Hours 
UK United Kingdom 
UNCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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2 Climate Policy Ambitiousness 
2.1 Taking stock of research on climate policy ambitiousness  
Even though ‘ambitiousness’ is a crucial concept in the literature on national climate policy, it 
is seldom clearly defined. National climate policies may assume many different characteristics 
and may vary along several dimensions. Assessments of climate policy have tended to have 
‘the level of ambition’ as their explanatory focus (e.g. Underdal 2002; Wurzel and Connelly 
2011; Christoff and Eckersley 2011). However, few authors have developed specific criteria 
for assessing ambitiousness – perhaps because single case studies have dominated, and there 
has been no common, comparative research programme on climate policy in political science.  
Questions of climate policy have attracted increased scholarly interest in the past decade. We 
find rich literatures on emissions trading (e.g. Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008; Meckling 2011), 
the political economy of climate change (e.g. Newell and Paterson 2011), global climate 
negotiations/politics (e.g. Aldy and Stavins 2009; Hoffmann 2011) and EU climate policy 
(Jordan et al. 2010; Boasson and Wettestad 2013). National climate policy has been assessed in 
a range of recent books, such as Harris (2007), Wurzel and Connelly (2011), Watanabe (2011) 
and Christoff and Eckersley (2011). These contributions present and discuss interesting 
empirical cases – without, however, discussing how ambitiousness could or should be 
conceptualized and defined in empirical studies. This lack of theory-oriented and comparative 
analysis means that there are few analytical tools available for assessing the ambitiousness of 
different national climate-policy portfolios.  
The existence of deep disagreements concerning climate-policy design makes it particularly 
challenging to develop good measurement criteria. Such disagreement is not unique to studies 
of climate policy: this is very often the case with environmental policy as well (see Andresen et 
al. 2012). Scholars of international environmental policy have explicitly discussed how to 
measure ambitiousness. Even though their subject is international environmental regimes, not 
national climate policy, this literature is relevant. It shows that the ultimate proof of the 
ambitiousness of a policy lies in its ability to solve environmental problems, and the 
effectiveness with which this happens. Ultimately, we want to know how much climate 
policies have achieved – in particular, the extent to which they have succeeded in reducing 
GHG emissions. We are interested in identifying how much a policy has contributed to 
whatever progress has been made (see Mitchell 2008).  
Measuring ambitiousness is challenging even when the result of the policies, and not the 
policy as such, is taken as the starting point. The literature discusses various measurement 
methods are discussed in the literature, with particular attention to two. First, the researchers 
may construct a no-policy counterfactual and compare the actual situation after the 
8 
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international environmental regime, or the national climate policy in our case, is implemented 
with this counterfactual (Hovi et al. 2003:77; Young 2001). Counterfactuals, often referred to 
as ‘business as usual scenarios’, are inherently difficult to construct: no-one can possibly be 
certain what an alternative would or could look like in the absence of a given policy.  
Second, process tracing can be used to examine the relationship between a policy and actual 
environmental performance (Hovi et al. 2003:77; Young 2001). This is easier said than done. 
Measurement is tricky, because climate policy is only one out of whole range of factors that 
influence the development of emissions. Moreover, since countries rely on differing energy 
sources and varying industry structures, they will face differing abatement costs and technical 
challenges.  
It is not clear towards which goal actual progress should be measured. For instance, is 
achieving short-term reductions in emissions more important than shifts from fossil fuel-
based energy systems towards renewable energy systems, eventually leading to reduced 
emissions? Moreover, the truly global nature of climate change makes it impossible for single 
countries to do much to solve the problem on their own.  
Environmental policy ambitions can be determined by comparing policy outcomes with 
scientific advice, but disagreement concerning appropriate levels of carbon emissions makes it 
intrinsically challenging to use scientific advices as a yardstick for ambitiousness in climate 
policy. Science holds that we must cut emissions drastically, but the pace and timing of 
reduction efforts is contested (see Solomon et al. 2007). Nonetheless, given the overwhelming 
extent of the climate challenge, most national climate policies appear far from sufficiently 
ambitious for putting the scientific advice into practice. In order to assess national climate 
policy we will have to specify some kind of national measurement standard, but disagreement 
runs deep about the suitability of various possible standards. Are, for instance, national 
emissions reductions and funding of emissions reductions elsewhere are of similar value? Are 
high- or low-cost reduction measures more appropriate? 
More importantly, both counterfactual and actual performance measurement requires that the 
policy to be evaluated has been operating long enough to yield results. We cannot expect 
policies and measures to achieve actual mitigation immediately: it may take a decade or more 
before the effects of a climate policy can be assessed. The six countries explored in this report 
have introduced a range of policy changes during the last decade and it is far too early to 
assess the results of these policies. In other words, we cannot assess the ambitiousness of 
current policies by measuring their effects – so neither of the methods discussed in the regime 
literature are suitable for our purposes. Moreover, since different sectors and different 
countries face different challenges in achieving low-carbon societies, it would be highly 
demanding to develop a standard for level of ambition that can cover more than one country 
or even more than one sector. In order to create a foundation for comparative research, we 
will have to capture other and less normative dimensions of policy outcomes.  
Rather than trying to develop a one-dimensional ambitiousness standard, with a coherent set 
of criteria, this report develops three different dimensions of ambitiousness in climate policy. 
This will enable us to capture the variance in national climate-policy portfolios without 
becoming enmeshed in the underlying disagreements on ideal climate-policy design. 
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Specifying Three Dimensions of Ambitiousness 
 
Based on the IPCC assessment report on mitigation, I distinguish three different aspects of 
ambitiousness to guide assessment of ambitiousness in climate policy (see also Metz et al. 
2007). These are presented in Table 2.2 (a) Market Approach, (b) Minimizing Societal Costs, 
and (c) Technical Development. Business economists are likely to give weight to (a), 
governmental economists to (b) and engineers to (c). Hence they represent three different 
professional logics, providing different policy recipes and evaluation criteria against which 
policy success can be measured. 
The market approach (a) assumes that commercial organizations possess perfect informa¬tion 
and are capable of acting strategically on this information (Fligstein 2001:13). Firms are 
expected to strive to maximize their profits in a medium- to long-term perspective. In this 
perspective, governments should work to ensure that low-carbon investments are the most 
profitable option. Measures should be market-based, to encourage market actors to compete 
in developing the most profitable low-carbon projects (Sims et al. 2007:306). Thereby the 
‘best’ projects will be developed, and actors able to develop the most profitable projects will 
be rewarded with the greatest profits. Emissions trading systems as well as green certificate 
schemes for renewable energy are basically designed in line with this logic (see Commission 
2005; 2008). This dimension of ambitiousness sees the climate-policy challenge from the 
business perspective: profit-maximising organizations tend to prefer a combination of 
negative measures (e.g. a price on CO2) and positive ones (e.g. state aid) in order to make the 
transition smoother for companies. 
Table 2.2 Three Dimensions of Climate-policy Ambitiousness  
Ambitiousness 
dimension 
Components 
 
Market Minimizing societal cost Technical development 
Strategic concern Allowing corporate actors maximize 
corporate profits. 
Minimizing societal costs. Enhancing technical 
development. 
Role of 
commercial 
organizations 
Engaging in strategic competition 
aimed at maximizing corporate 
profits 
Engaging in all endeavours 
that yield profit. 
Inventing, developing and 
refining promising 
technologies. 
Appropriate 
climate-policy 
strategy 
Market-based support schemes 
that favour the most profitable low-
carbon solutions.  
Raising the price of 
technologies with negative 
societal effects. Support to 
projects requiring the lowest 
level of state aid. 
Fostering a wide range of 
technologies by introducing 
various technology-specific 
measures.  
Climate-policy 
objectives 
Low carbon solutions are the most 
competitive 
Implement lowest-cost 
mitigation measures first  
Transform the energy 
system 
Governmental 
measures 
Market measures (e.g. emissions 
trading and green certificate 
schemes)  
 
Emissions trading.  
CO2 tax.  
Cost-efficient state funding.  
Governmental industry 
development. 
Technology standards. 
Number of 
measures 
Combination of negative and 
positive incentives 
 
As few as possible  Many measures 
 
Also the ‘minimizing societal cost’ dimension (b) is founded on the assumption of rational 
economic actors. However, according to this view, corporations will not seek out the most 
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profitable projects, but will engage in all endeavours that can yield profits (Stiglitz and Walsh 
2006:158). This strategy will aim at ensuring that conventional industries shift to a low-carbon 
economy in ways that involve a minimum of societal costs (Gupta et al. 2007:751). Cost 
minimization is best ensured by emplacing an extra cost on the undesirable effects of 
conventional production, such as CO2 emissions. This may be done by introducing a tax or an 
emissions trading system, but designs that allow considerable free allocations will not be in 
line with this logic. 
 
Subsidizing investments in low-carbon products is a second-best option. This should be done 
only for budding technologies still in need of basic research. Support schemes should be 
designed to ensure that such subsidies go only to those projects that require the lowest level of 
support in order to break even, and not to any projects that are profitable already at the 
outset. That in turn necessitates comparing the cost structures of all possible projects, to 
identify which projects need the least support. The government has the upper hand, as it 
determines not only the criteria but also which actors will receive support. This approach 
values simplicity in policy development; there should be as few regulations as possible.   
The third dimension is based on technological rather than economic criteria. It is assumed 
that industrial change hinges on technological innovation and its sub¬sequent refinement. 
Commercial organizations will aim to enhance technological develop¬¬ment, and the 
government should ensure good and stable conditions that enable them to do so. It is the 
technical quality of the alternatives to conventional production that determines the support 
levels, so different technologies will receive different levels of support. Moreover, in this logic, 
support schemes are designed to ensure long-term stability, so that commercial actors may use 
the time and resources needed to refine those technologies in which they have greatest 
expertise (Sims et al. 2007:306). Feed-in tariff schemes that guarantee producers of renewable 
energy access to the grid, a fixed level of operational support and varying levels of support for 
different technologies fit well with this approach (Commission 2005; 2008). The incentives for 
competitive behaviour and cost minimization are weak. Technology standards, such as 
emission limits or energy performance requirements, also fit this logic. Complex and 
encompassing climate policy portfolios are seen as an appropriate response to the many-
faceted challenge of climate change.  
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2.2 Measuring Ambitiousness: Method and Operationalization 
 
Having presented the three dimensions of ambitiousness, we move on to specify the criteria. 
The five countries studied here will first be given scores on the four sub-issues: climate policy 
objectives, emissions regulations, renewable energy policy and energy-efficiency policy. A 
climate policy measure will be given varying scores on ambitiousness depending on which 
dimensions tare taken into account. Countries will be given a sub-issue ranking only on the 
dimension that fits their policy profile the best. For instance, a country that has an emissions-
regulation profile well in line with the technology-development dimension will be ranked 
according to this dimension only. This approach enables us to capture underlying patterns in 
the countries’ policy profiles, but it is a crude simplification and it underlines policy 
differences rather than policy similarities across countries.  
The sub-issue rankings will be summarized into the overall scores for the different countries. 
Countries with inconsistent policy profiles in one issue-area could have been scored on several 
ambitiousness dimensions at the same time. However, such an approach would have made it 
very hard to develop a well-balanced coherent mark for the national climate policy portfolios 
in total. For instance, a country that had been ranked along several dimensions would have 
received more high scores than a country that had been ranked along only one dimension. 
Whichever approach is taken, it will be impossible to rank and score ambitiousness with a 
high degree of accuracy. This report suggests a measurement method that highlights how 
different criteria result in radically different ranking of countries.  
Table 2.3.1 specifies the criteria for ranking Emissions Reduction Targets in terms of 
ambitiousness. This operationalization is based onn  Table 2.2, in chapter 2.2.  
Table 2.3.1 Criteria for Assessing GHG Emissions Reduction Targets   
Ambitiousness 
dimension 
Criteria 
 
Market Minimizing societal cost Technical development 
Geographical 
focus  
Global  Global  National  
Target structure  Flexible Flexible  Detailed interim-targets 
leading up to 2050 
It is not possible to delineate between the two economic dimensions of assessing emissions-
reduction target as to ambitiousness: both dimensions favour a global perspective on 
emissions reductions and a flexible target structure that enables the country to take the 
development of global commitments into account. Measures that do not immediately result in 
significant emissions reductions but that may underpin future emission reductions (e.g. 
construction of renewable energy plants, or infrastructure for electric cars) are not important 
in this perspective. The focus here is on short-term targets, not long-term ones. In contrast, 
national targets and development of detailed interim targets leading up to 2050 are favoured 
by the technology-development view on ambitiousness. This perspective accords just as much 
attention to long-term plans as to immediate reductions in emissions reductions, and is thus 
less precise than the economic criteria. 
12 
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Table 2.3.2 Criteria for Assessing GHG Emissions Regulations 
Ambitiousness 
dimension 
Criteria 
 
Market Minimizing societal cost Technical developments 
Number of 
measures   
Not important  Few Many 
Favoured 
measure   
Combinations of voluntary 
agreements and GHG emissions 
pricing  
GHG emissions pricing 
adjusted to ETS 
Emissions performance 
regulations and energy 
taxation 
Turning to GHG emissions regulation, the three perspectives differ when it comes to the 
number and kind of measures that are favoured. Criteria for Assessment of Emissions 
Regulations are presented in Table 2.3.2. According to the market view, the number of 
measures is not very important, as long as the corporate actors are given economic incentives 
as well as softer measures, such as voluntary agreements. We would not expect much general 
energy taxation, because it does not target GHG emissions directly, and we would not expect 
much direct regulation, since this reduces the leeway of market actors.  
In an ideal world, the Minimizing Societal Cost dimension would favour GHG pricing as the 
only emission regulation. Since ETS has failed to produce a high carbon price and only parts 
of the emissions are included in ETS, it would be acceptable to develop some additional 
national measures, in order to create a significant price on carbon and other greenhouse gases.  
A high ranking according to the Minimizing Societal Cost dimension requires that GHG 
emissions pricing measures are dominant, and that national measures are carefully adjusted to 
ETS. Turning to the Technology Development view on ambitiousness, here we would expect 
extensive use of energy taxation combined with various kinds of emissions performance 
regulation. This is in line with the view that several instruments must be combined in order to 
get a good mix of emissions regulating measures. The three sets of criteria are presented in 
Table 2.3.2. 
Policy on renewable energy has many elements, but this report focus exclusively on target-
setting and support schemes for renewable energy electricity. That means that also the 
ambitiousness criteria are based solely on these two elements. Table 2.3.3 shows the 
differences in criteria for the three dimensions.  
A policy on renewable energy will get a high market ambitiousness score if it employs green 
certificate schemes; moreover, having ambitious short-term targets is an advantage in order to 
create stable conditions for the functioning of the scheme. By contrast, targets for the year 
2050 are less relevant to this perspective. The minimizing societal cost perspective is special in 
rejecting an active policy on renewable energy. This perspective highlights GHG emissions 
pricing as the core policy measure that should guide the use of renewable energy sources. 
Hence, all kinds of target-setting are seen as negative. Moreover, if renewable energy should 
get any support, that should be done in a way that ensures that no projects that are profitable 
at outset receive funding, and that only the least costly projects are realized. Neither feed-in 
nor green certificate schemes fit these criteria, because subsiding renewable energy can 
contribute to lower average prices on energy, which in turn can lead to higher demand for 
energy. In such instances, the net impact on emissions will be reduced. And, turning to 
13 
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technology development, detailed short- medium- and long-term objectives are regarded as 
important; feed-in schemes are the favoured support measure. 
Table 2.3.3 Criteria for Assessing Renewable Energy Policy  
Ambitiousness 
dimension 
Criteria 
 
Market Minimizing societal cost Technical development 
Measures   Green Certificate Scheme  No support measures (rely 
instead on emissions pricing) 
Feed-in schemes 
Target structure   Short- and medium-term targets   No targets Detailed short-, medium- 
and long-term targets 
Lastly, criteria for good energy-efficiency policies are presented in Table 2.3.4. According to 
the market view, clear short-term targets are advantageous. Further, countries should combine 
energy taxation with state aid measures; industry should be included in a tradable white 
certificates scheme or voluntary agreements, and the energy certification of buildings should 
be designed as a market measure. The ‘minimizing of societal cost’ view on ambitiousness 
stands out due to the importance it accords to simplicity in policy strategy. The prime position 
along this perspective is to rely on GHG emissions pricing and develop as few additional 
measures are possible. However, as it is acknowledged that not all good energy-efficiency 
measures are profitable, this perspective will accept support schemes that ensure that support 
goes only to such energy-efficiency measures as are profitable for society, but not profitable 
for individual persons or corporations. This goes for buildings as well as industry. Information 
measures (such as energy certification) are to be introduced only if they involve large gains and 
small costs: for instance, it will make sense to introduce energy certification only if the societal 
gains exceed the costs involving in issuing the certificates.  
The technology-development dimension favours state aid measures based on technical criteria, 
such as rules whereby all who undertake the same technical improvements of their building 
are eligible for the same support. Also important are stringent energy requirements in building 
codes and detailed, targeted information and training measures. The latter refers to energy 
certificates that provide building owners and residents with detailed advice. 
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Table 2.3.4 Criteria for Assessing Energy Efficiency Policy  
Ambitiousness 
dimension 
Criteria 
 
Market Minimizing societal cost Technical development 
Measures Tradable white certificates and 
voluntary agreements, energy 
certification designed in order to 
influence price developments in 
markets 
Preferably no measures. 
Cost-efficient state aid and 
low-cost information 
measures if profitable 
energy-efficiency measures 
remain un-realized.  
State aid based on technical 
criteria, energy requirements 
in building codes, and 
detailed, targeted 
information and training 
measures. 
Target structure   Short- and medium-term targets   No targets Detailed short-, medium- 
and long-term targets 
Along all of the three dimensions we can envisage policy with varying strength. For instance, 
the cap in the missions trading scheme may be high or low, the renewables quota in a green 
certificate scheme can be high or low, a CO2 tax can be set high or low, much or little money 
can be available in a state aid scheme, the technology standards can be strict or slack, and so 
forth. This report will not delve into questions concerning strength, but only take this into 
account in the cases when several countries score on the same dimension for a certain sub-
issue of climate policy.   
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3 National climate policy 
portfolios: empirical mapping 
3.1 Background information 
Before we dig deeper into the climate policy portfolios of the countries in focus here, 
important background information about their GHG emissions and energy systems is 
necessary. All six clearly face differing carbon mitigation challenges: Table 3.1 shows huge 
variation in total GHG emissions. This should come as no surprise, given the significant 
variation population size and size of the economies, but also other factors play into this.  
Not only do Germany and the UK have high total emissions, they have also reduced their 
emissions radically more than the other four since 1990. Much of these emission reductions 
stem from non-climate policy related factors, but Germany and the UK have also adopted 
forceful policies. All the six, except Norway, have reduced their emissions since 1990. 
Germany and the UK are in a class of their own, but also Denmark has impressive figures 
with more than 10% reductions.   
Table 3.1 Climate Emissions and Energy Situations in the Six Countries and the EU 
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Denmark 61 89 8.48 0.18 30.7 - 18.2 22.2 
France 522 93 5.52 0.16 19 49.3 12.9 
Germany 936 75 9.92 0.26 27.1 59.8 11.0 
Norway 54 108 8.01 0.12 45.1 - 517.4 61.1 
Sweden 66 91 5.07 0.12 26.6 36.5 47.9 
UK 590 77 7.78 0.21 23.8 28.3 3.2 
EU Total  4720 85 - - - 52.7 12.5 
Sources:  
*Eurostat 2013a  
** Eurostat (2013b) 
***IEA 2012 (CO2 emissions/population), 
**** IEA 2012 (using exchange rates)  
*****Gallagher et al. 2011 , 
******Eurostat 2012:28 and   
******Eurostat 2012:72. 
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France and Sweden have significantly lower CO2 emissions per capita than the other 
countries,  probably due to low CO2 emissions from their electricity production (primarily due 
to nuclear energy). Germany has the highest per capita emissions by far, but Denmark, 
Norway and the UK also have much higher emissions than France or Sweden. Note that 
Norway has rather high per capita emissions, despite the low emissions relating to electricity 
production. Measured in terms of CO2 intensity, emissions are low in Norway. Being a 
prosperous country with a high share of renewables and a resource-efficient economy 
contributes to that.  
Germany has a radically higher CO2-intensive economy than the other countries, with figures 
more than twice as high as those of Sweden and Norway. This reflects the fact that Germany 
has been the industrial motor in Europe, with a large share of Europe’s energy-intensive 
industry and substantial volumes of fossil fuel power production. Industry activity also plays 
an important role in the Swedish and Danish economies, but their industries are ‘cleaner’ than 
those of Germany. We should also note that because petroleum activity is included in 
industry, its contribution to Norway’s GDP is high.  
When it comes to energy dependence, Norway is clearly the outlier. Thanks to its vast oil and 
gas exports, the country exports five times more energy than it consumes. Denmark is the 
only EU country with a small energy surplus, but this is minor compared to Norway. All the 
other countries are energy importers. Decreasing energy dependence is a major political 
concern in the EU, and these figures tell us why. EU imports half of its energy, Germany 
imports 60% and France imports 50%. Sweden and the UK import some 30% each. 
Lastly, the share of renewable energy varies from 3% in the UK to 61% in Norway. However, 
Norway would have had a lower figure if energy use at the petroleum installations were 
included. Having close to 100% renewable share in electricity consumption contributes 
substantially to the high figure. Sweden is close to Norway with 48%, while Denmark has 22% 
and Germany and France have 11% and 13%. France has some old hydropower while the 
German figure is dominated by new renewables. The UK’s renewable energy figure is very 
low, indicating an especially challenging situation.  
All six countries face challenges when it comes to mitigation of climate change. Most must 
deal with two challenges in conjunction:  reducing their energy dependence, and replacing 
fossil fuel (and nuclear) in their electricity consumption with renewable energy. The exception 
is Norway, which already has a high renewables share, and petroleum extraction as its 
economic driver. Germany faces the most severe challenges in transforming its industry and 
energy system to a carbon-constrained world, but also the UK, Denmark and France find 
themselves in difficulties. Sweden and Norway start the low-carbon transition from better 
positions, although in Norway the petroleum sector constitutes a considerable part of the 
economy and contributes to carbon emissions both domestically and abroad. 
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The impacts displayed in Table 2 represent impacts to the setors before adaptation takes place. 
In principle, they describe the situation that economic agents face after climate change has 
take place, but before they have taken any action to adapt. In practice, this is only a part of the 
story, however, because each of the 11 sectors in GRACE are aggregates of many sub sectors. 
Some of the adaptation that takes place within each sector should be included in the estimates 
in Table 2. For example, if climate change leads to a shift from crop yields to livestock in 
agriculture, this shift ought to be implicit in the impacts estimate because the production 
function is an expression for the maxium output for the sector aggretate at a given 
combination of prices. 
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3.2 Emissions Reduction Objectives 
The six actors frame their overarching climate policy strategies differently. (See Table 3.2.) 
Not only have they adopted different short and long-term objectives, some focus solely on 
national emissions development while others also aim to ensure emission-reduction activities 
elsewhere. 
Table 3.2 GHG Emissions Reduction Targets 
 Kyoto/Burden- 
sharing 
 targets % 
2020 – % target  
from 1990 
2030 target % 2050 target % 
Denmark - 21 - 40 - - 
France 0 - 22.5  - 75 
Germany - 21 - 40 - 80 from 1990 - 80-95  from 
1990 
Norway + 1 - 30 Carbon neutral if global deal Carbon neutral 
Sweden + 4 - 40, some abroad Carbon neutral No net-emissions 
UK - 12.5 - 50 by 2025  - 80 from 1990 
Sources: Sources for the targets are found in the text below  
* European Parliament and Council (2009),  
** EEA (2012) 
For the EU, climate and energy policy was once a matter of minor political importance on the 
agenda, with issues like the internal market, enlargement and monetary policies ranking far 
higher (Boasson and Wettestad 2013). After a decade of severe political conflicts and primarily 
symbolic policy outcomes in the 1990s, climate policy soared from being ‘just another’ part of 
EU environmental policy to become a high-profile policy area in its own right. Especially 
from 2005 onwards, the pace of developments has been rapid indeed. By the end of the 
decade, many new and ambitious targets had been adopted, complemented by a broad palette 
of specific, binding policies. Climate policy has emerged as a vital area of EU governance. 
EU climate policy can be defined in many different ways. The EU itself tends to include 
emissions trading (ETS), the burden-sharing agreement, renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
the energy performance of policy of buildings, energy labelling, eco-design, emissions targets 
for cars, environmental aid guidelines and the fluorinated gases regulation as EU climate 
policies. Also other EU policy areas may influence national efforts to mitigate climate change, 
but they are not discussed explicitly in this report.  
The EU has adopted three ‘20% by 2020’ targets: a 20% reduction in GHGs by 2020, 
increasing to 30% if other OECD countries follow suit, a binding EU-wide 20% target for the 
use of renewable energies, and a non-binding 20% improvement in energy efficiency. The 
greenhouse gas target and the renewable energy targets are binding, whereas the energy-
efficiency target is only indicative. The following sections of this report present national 
targets and measures derived from these overarching EU targets. 
The 20% GHG target is to be met through the EU ETS, as well as the non-ETS sectors. This 
will be done by a 21% reduction in EU ETS sectors and a reduction of around 10% compared 
to 2005 for sectors not covered by the EU ETS. The ETS covers CO2 emissions (above 
certain capacity thresholds) from power stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, 
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coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, 
pulp, paper and cardboard. Aviation was added in 2012. The EU effort-sharing agreement 
covers all other sectors, and provides emissions limits for all EU member states (European 
Parliament and Council 2009; Lacasta 2010). Some Eastern and Central European members 
are allowed to increase their emissions, but most member states are required to reduce their 
emissions substantially.  
EU climate policy both constrains and enables national climate policy developments. Some 
areas of climate policy are fairly centralized, allowing EU member states and EEA countries 
little leeway, whereas in other areas the EU presents a framework or gives encouragement to 
national policymaking. The ETS is far more centralized than any other EU climate policy 
measures. Moreover, some EU climate policies encourage member states to develop national 
technology development measures, while others encourage the use of economic criteria and 
market measures. The EU has embarked on a process of setting 2030 targets, but we cannot 
say how long it will to reach agreement on this. These EU developments should be kept in 
mind when we move on to assess the national objectives.  
Denmark was given one of the highest emissions-reduction targets in the effort-sharing 
agreement that the EU developed as its main measure for following up the common Kyoto 
commitment. Denmark is on track to meet this commitment (Energistyrelsen 2010). In the 
1990s, Denmark was a frontrunner in European climate policy development. It reversed many 
of its policies in the period around year 2000, but has since revitalized its climate policies. The 
minority coalition government that took office in 2011 announced that they would lead by 
example and established 40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 as an overarching 
objective (KEB 2011:1). This implies a 20% reduction in non-ETS sectors.  
In 2012, all parties in the Danish parliament (except the Liberal Alliance Party) reached 
agreement on future energy policy. This agreement, slightly less ambitious than proposed by 
the government, is projected to contribute to 34% reduction of GHG emissions by 2020 
(KEB 2013). Various task forces and assessments have been initiated in order to promote the 
policy steps needed to reach the 2020 target, and the government is expected to propose a 
climate policy action plan in the near future. Denmark has not developed targets for 2030 or 
2050 targets, but when Denmark held the EU presidency it proposed that the EU should 
adopt a 40% 2030 target and a 60% 2040 target (Information 2012). Rather than developing 
detailed carbon targets, Denmark has developed specific targets for transformation of its 
national energy system. This will be explored in greater detail in the coming chapters.  
France did not develop many national climate policies in the 1990s, but its policy portfolio 
started to grow after 2000. In 2003, President Chirac announced ‘a factor four’ reduction 
target: a 75% reduction in its CO2 emissions by 2050 (Szarka 2008). This objective was 
incorporated in law in 2005, making France one of the first countries to undertake a legally 
binding commitment to a long-term emission reduction target (Szarka 2011:116).  
Every second year France publishes a national programme for tackling climate change, 
synthesizing existing regulations with implications for climate emissions (GLOBE 
International 2013:170; UNFCCC 2011:5). France initiated an original and interesting national 
climate policy process in 2007: the ‘Grenelle de l’environnement’ process, named after the 
Grenelle Agreements negotiated between the government and the unions during the unrest 
and events of 1968. The Grenelle working group on climate change involved labour unions, 
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trade associations, environmental groups, professional bodies, regional authorities and other 
governmental organizations (MEDDE 2009:6). This resulted in some principles and measures 
adopted in 2009, and more detailed policies adopted in June 2010. Emissions reductions and 
energy-efficiency improvements in the building sector are main priorities (GLOBE 
International 2013:171). In all, some 16,900 stakeholders were involved in the Grenelle 
process (UNFCCC 2011:13). 
The Grenelle process resulted in substantive new climate policymaking. The French 
government expects it to lead to policy measures that will enable them to cut emissions by 
22.8% between 1990 and 2020. The key role played by local municipalities is a special feature 
of French climate policy strategy. Since 2004, 200 local authorities have developed climate 
plans.  The Grenelle process strengthened the requirements for local authorities by requiring 
localities with more than 50,000 residents to emplace climate and energy plans (PCETs) by the 
end of 2012 (UNFCCC 2011:11).  
Thus far, most French climate policy developments have been rooted in EU law, but the new 
socialist government has signalled more independent climate policymaking (GLOBE 
International 2013:171). Soon after taking office in 2012, it initiated a new debate on energy 
transition. A national commission with broad participation was established, to develop a new 
energy bill; this bill will be decided in the course of 2013. The new government has also 
announced that it will support a 40% EU reduction target for 2030 and 60% by the year 2040 
(Business Green 2013).  
In 1990, Germany adopted as a target to cut its CO2 emissions by 25% by the year 2005. 
Although this was later reduced to 21% in EU negotiations, Germany still had a very high 
target compared with other EU countries. From the outset it was clear that a significant share 
of the reductions would be related to other features than climate policy: re-unification and the 
related closures and restructuring of East German industry brought a dramatic decrease in 
emissions (Hasselmeier and Wettestad 2000). Germany has also developed a broad climate 
policy portfolio, with technology-specific feed-in support to renewable energy as a central 
component. Preliminary EU assessments indicate that Germany will overachieve its burden-
sharing target for the Kyoto period (European Commission 2012).   
Energy system transformation is at the core of German climate policy strategy, not emissions 
developments as such. Germany’s climate policy strategy is known as ‘Energiewende’; 
according to the government, this strategy is ‘about designing and implementing a long-term 
overall strategy for the period up to the year 2050.’ BMU (2012:3). Nuclear power phase-out 
has played a crucial role in the development of this strategy. Germany’s first coalition 
government to involve the Green Party in 2000 implemented the feed-in law and a nuclear 
phase‐out. The Conservative coalition under Chancellor Merkel reversed this nuclear 
consensus in 2010, commonly referred to as ‘the phase-out of the phase-out’, thereby allowing 
the country’s nuclear plants to run for an additional 8 to 14 years, depending on their age 
(Gawel et al. 2012:3; Schreurs 2012:30). Then the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 made it 
crucial to re‐evaluate nuclear power – and, in a spectacular policy U‐turn, another phase‐out 
was introduced in 2011, aimed at terminating all nuclear power in Germany by 2022. One 
plant is to be shut down in each of the years 2015, 2017, and 2019, and the remaining six are 
to be taken off line in 2021 and 2022 (Schreurs 2012:37).  
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Greenhouse gas emissions are to be cut by 40% by 2020, with 1990 as the base year 
(FMENCNS 2011:4). Further, plans foresee a 55% reduction by 2030, a 70% reduction by 
2040 and 80–95% reduction by 2050. These objectives are supplemented by a range of 
detailed renewable energy and energy-efficiency targets, presented in the following sections.  
Norway started to develop a national climate policy already in the late 1980s.  Ever since, cost 
efficiency and the ‘double regulation’ principle have been central in all parliamentary reports 
on Norwegian climate policy: if an area is covered by a general measure (such as CO2 tax or 
ETS) it should not be covered by additional measures as well (Boasson 2011; Innst. S. nr. 145 
2007 – 2008). In practice, this has not hindered the emergence of a range of new measures 
relating to renewable energy, energy efficiency and CCS. 
A high share of renewables in electricity production and increasing emissions from offshore 
industry pose special challenges as regards cutting. In 2008, a range of new targets were 
adopted, and the parliament decided that the Kyoto target should be overachieved by 10% 
(Innst. S. nr. 145 2007 – 2008). Emissions reductions were to be ensured primarily through 
requirement of external allowances. Further, Norway was the first country to declare that it 
aimed for carbon neutrality by the year 2050. A vast majority in the parliament agreed that this 
be moved forward to 2030, if an ambitious global climate deal could be developed. In 2008 it 
was also agreed that two thirds of Norway’s emissions reductions shall stem from within 
Norway, when land use and land use change is included, while the remainder can be realized 
abroad. It was also decided that if a new international climate agreement were achieved, that 
would necessitate a new assessment of the Norwegian objectives.  
In 2012 came a new parliamentary report on climate policy (St. meld. St. 21 2011–2012). It 
included various new measures, including a climate and energy fund for development of 
technology and industrial transformation, but, despite the formulations in the 2008 political 
agreement, it did not introduce new strategic objectives. Instead, reference was made to the 
agreement from 2008, stating that it was still valid. Lack of specific references to the ‘two 
thirds’ target has created uncertainty as to whether it remains valid. The Minister of the 
Environment continued to refer to this target in public, but it is not specifically mentioned in 
official documents (see VG 2012 and Miljøverndepartementet 2013).  Representatives from 
the Ministry of Finance who have provided input to this report have made it clear that they do 
not regard the two-thirds target as a guiding objective today.    
In 2012 Norway signed a second Kyoto commitment period in line with the 2020 target of 
reducing emissions by 30% compared to 1990 levels. This implies that emissions on average 
(2013–2020) should equal 84% of 1990 emissions. Official documents repeatedly declare that 
Norway is to become a low-carbon society. Exactly what this means in practice is not 
specified, but it probably means the same as the carbon-neutral target set for 2050.  
Norway has put considerable effort into influencing the global climate negotiation, but 
accords less attention to EU climate policy in its own strategic policy climate documents. For 
instance, the global negotiation situation is discussed in length in St.meld. 21 2011–2012, but 
few other EU policies than ETS are mentioned. Norway has launched a Climate and Forest 
Initiative, aiming at supporting efforts to slow, and eventually reduce GHG emissions 
resulting from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+), and 
has granted 3 billion Norwegian kroner annually for this project. Emissions reductions from 
these efforts are not to be counted towards the Norwegian targets, but come in addition.  
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Sweden started to develop a climate policy in the early 1990s (Nilsson 2005a). In 1996, the 
government presented the creation of a ‘Green People’s Home’ as a new mission for the 
Social Democratic Party, just as creation of a welfare state and a ‘People’s Home’ had been its 
historic mission. Stricter taxation and a range of support schemes for renewable energy 
development were introduced. The EU effort-sharing agreement allowed Sweden to increase 
its emissions by 4%, but the government later decided to aim for a 4% reduction (Nilsson 
2005b).  
Initially, carbon taxation, and promotion of renewable heating and biopower plants were the 
core features of Swedish climate policy (Nilson 2005a, 2005b). Transformation of the energy 
system, not emissions reductions as such, was central in the national climate strategy in the 
period 2000–2010. Market measures gradually became important in the Swedish climate 
strategy, and a tradable green certificate scheme for renewable electricity was introduced in 
2003.  
In 2006, then-prime minister Göran Persson headed a commission on fossil fuel 
independence, which issuedg the report ‘Making Sweden an Oil-free Society’ (Swedish: På väg 
mot ett oljefritt Sverige). This came with recommendations for breaking Sweden’s dependency 
on oil. The Social Democratic government headed by Persson stepped down after the 2006 
elections, and the new government declared that it wanted to ‘lead Sweden swiftly out of the 
fossil fuel based society’, but it had more of a global focus than a strict strategy for 
transforming the country’s energy system.  
In 2009, the Swedish parliament adopted a 40% carbon commitment for 2020 
(Miljödepartementet 2009). This implied a reduction of 20 million tons, of which some 7 
million tons were to be acquired thorough climate measures outside of Sweden. The Swedish  
International Climate Investment Programme invests in Clean Development Mechanisms 
(CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) projects on behalf on the Swedish government. In 
2011, the Swedish government initiated a process towards the development of a new climate 
policy strategy, and commissioned an assessment for ‘a Sweden without climate emissions in 
2050’ (Naturvårdsverket 2012). This provided a basis for discussions in a consultative group 
led by the environmental minister and consisting of environmental organizations, business and 
researchers. The report focuses mainly on future Swedish measures and Swedish positions in 
EU discussions, but it also argues that acquirement of emission allowances in international 
markets is necessary in order to achieve the long-term objective.  
The UK was initially rather lax when it came to climate policy development. The EU burden-
sharing agreement required a 12.5% emissions cut by 2020 as compared to 1990. This 
necessitated adopting some new policy measures, but economic policies in the early 1990s had 
already ensured substantial emissions reductions (see Boasson and Wettestad 2013). However, 
the Labour Party that took office in 1997 had a strong commitment to climate change, and 
eventually the UK developed a range of original climate policy measures. Its Climate Change 
Act is the most remarkable piece of policy. It regulates the development of short- and long-
term binding GHG commitments, committing the UK to reduce GHG emissions by 80% 
from the 1990 baseline by 2050. The UK was the first country to develop such legally binding, 
long-term carbon emissions-reduction targets (Rayner and Jordan 2011). The Climate Change 
Act makes it the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon account for 
the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline (Climate Change Act 2008: 1.1). 
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The target as well as the percentage may be amended by the Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change, if accepted by both Houses of Parliament.  
The Climate Change Act requires extensive carbon budgeting and creates a Climate Change 
Committee, consisting of experts outside the government (Climate Change Act 2008). The 
Committee recommends carbon budgets to the government, which must then decide whether 
to adopt them. If it does not do so, the government must give an account of why it is rejecting 
the Committee’s advice. Recommendations from the committee for the first three carbon 
budgets 2013–2017 and 2018–22) were agreed by the government in 2009 (Lockwood 
2013:12). The first budget period (2008–2012) covered the first Kyoto period, and set a cap of 
cap 22% below 1990 baseline. The second budget period, from 2013–2017, requires emissions 
in this period to be 28% below baseline. The 2018–2022 budget requires emissions to be 34% 
below baseline. The fourth carbon budget, agreed in 2011, requires emissions reduction of 
50% as against 1990 levels by 2025 (CCC 2011). 
The UK has developed a broad climate policy portfolio and has recently updated and changed 
many central policy measures. ‘Cost-efficiency’ is a central term in the climate policy 
documents, but there has been a shift from the dominance of market measures to greater use 
of direct state aid and technology-specific mechanisms (HM Government 2011). Moreover, 
while emissions trading used to be the most important element in UK climate policy, energy 
efficiency has now taken centre stage. 
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3.3 Emissions Regulations 
This section presents the emissions regulation profiles of the six countries. Table 3.3 shows 
the various kinds of measures that constrain, or aim at constraining, GHG emissions. The 
ETS is in many respects the most important carbon regulation in Europe, but is not included 
here since it is administered at the EU level and applies to installations in all six nations.  
Table 3.3 describes energy taxation as well as carbon taxation, which are closely linked in most 
countries. Some energy taxes are motivated by climate concerns, but other justifications are 
also possible. For instance, fiscals concerns have been important for energy taxation in the 
Nordic countries (see Klok et al. 2004). The implicit tax rate on energy is the ratio between 
energy tax revenues and final energy consumption calculated for the calendar year. Energy tax 
revenues are measured in euros (deflated) and the final energy consumption as toe (tonnes of 
oil equivalent) (Eurostat 2013). ETS costs come in addition to this. Costs of renewable energy 
support schemes that are paid directly by the consumer are not included. 
Table 3.3 Emissions Regulations 
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Denmark 289 82 Yes 38.3 - 20 No No 
France 147 61 No 21.9 - 14 No Ban on fraching 
Germany 183 58 Yes 49.1 - 14 No No 
Norway 156 93 No 36.4 -  -  Flaring and CCS requirements 
Sweden 214 79 Yes 31.6 - 17 No No 
UK 264   73 Yes 40.2 - 16 Carbon Price 
Floor 
450g/kWh emission limit 
Sources:  
* Eurostat 2013, per tonne of oil equivalents.  
** OECD 2013:31, tax rate (EUR per tonne CO2).  
Other sources are found in the text below. 
 
The EU conducts emissions regulation through the ETS, which is based on the idea that all 
large point-source emitters of CO2 must have allowances equivalent to their annual emissions. 
More than 10,000 ‘installations’ in the power-producing and power-consuming/energy-
intensive industries (such as refineries, steel and cement) are targeted (European Commission 
2008). Companies may buy and sell these allowances as deemed necessary. The availability and 
distribution of allowances are shaped by state regulations, which will influence how the market 
forces will work and hence what the carbon price will be. All types of emissions-trading 
systems are based on market thinking, but the degree of market streamlining can vary 
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significantly (see OECD 2006). This applies particularly to allocation methods, where the 
auctioning of allowances is a more ‘market-aligned’ method than free allocations.  
The 2009 ETS Directive goes a long way towards establishing a Single European Market for 
carbon emissions. The ETS post-2013 establishes auctioning as the main allocation method 
(see section 15 in the preamble to Directive 2009/29/EC, European Parliament and Council 
2009b). Some 40% of allowances will be auctioned in 2013, rising to around 70% by 2020. 
This means that the distribution of allowances will increasingly be based on market criteria 
(like willingness and ability to pay), with a corresponding reduction in the influence of 
technical and political considerations. These changes will reinforce the overall character of the 
ETS as a transnational market measure. The carbon price is currently very low, at some 3–4 
euros. This applies for all countries assessed in this study, except the UK, which has its own 
national carbon floor price.  
Denmark has a long tradition of energy and environmental taxation, introducing its first 
energy tax in 1917, and a range of energy taxes in the late 1970s (Klok et al. 2006). A drop in 
world fuel prices led to significant tax increases in 1986. Due to climate concerns, a CO2 tax 
was introduced in 1993, but industry was reimbursed for some or most of the costs. The 
revenues from the CO2 tax were earmarked for renewable energy. The CO2 tax for 
households as well as industry increased several times during the ensuing two decades. 
Denmark adopted a green taxation reform in 2009, prior to the Copenhagen climate summit 
(Energistyrelsen 2011:14). The structure of energy taxation was changed in order to improve 
interaction with the ETS. The justification was to ensure a similar carbon-related burden 
between ETS and non-ETS sectors and avoid overlap between the Danish carbon tax and the 
EU ETS (OECD 2013:89). The reform increased the rate of most energy and CO2 taxes, and 
the rates have not been changed since. 
Table 3.3 shows that Denmark still has the highest level of energy taxation of all the countries 
assessed in this report. The carbon tax is also high: only Norway has a higher carbon tax rate. 
The energy tax is levied on fossil fuels and electricity (OECD 2013:89). Carbon taxes apply to 
all energy products used by businesses, at rates based on the emissions associated with the use 
of each fuel. Biofuels are not taxed. The carbon tax element is not levied on fuels used by 
sectors subject to the EU ETS. As a general rule, fuels used for power generation are 
therefore not taxed. However, a CO2 component is still levied on electricity consumption 
through the energy saving tax. Table 3.3 shows that less than 40% of Danish GHG emissions 
are covered by the ETS, while the country has the toughest non-ETS target of the five EU 
member states assessed in this report. 
Denmark has a tradition of voluntary energy-efficiency agreements with industry. About 60% 
of total energy use in trade and industry in Denmark is covered by voluntary agreements 
(Bertoldi and Rezessy 2010). The agreement between the government and the energy industry 
requires the energy companies to undertake specific measures to reduce customer energy end-
use (Energistyreselsen 2011:11). The most recent agreement with the energy industry requires 
energy savings to increase by 75% by 2013–2014 compared to 2010–2012, and by 100% in 
2015–2020 (Dansk Energi 2013). In November 2012, the Danish business association for 
electricity and the Danish Ministry for Climate, Energy and Buildings signed the most recent 
agreement. Such agreements are quite detailed as to the precise actions that signatories are 
required to undertake specific activities (Bertoldi and Rezessy 2010). Only electricity 
consumption is covered, so as to not overlap with the ETS.  
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France has shown a consistent preference for uniform application of emission reduction 
measures in the EU, and in the 1990s it took part in the coalition that supported adoption of 
an EU carbon tax (Szarka 2011:118). In fact, the idea of a national carbon tax had been 
launched already in the mid-1990s, but the French constitutional court ruled against it, and it 
was never adopted (Szarka 2008:129). Ten years later, the Grenelle process agreed on 
introducing a carbon tax at 17 euro in 2010 (MEDDE 2009:10). This gave rise to new 
discussions with the constitutional court, which called for the inclusion of industrial 
installations that were granted ETS allowances for free (EuroActive 2010). Eventually, the 
government abandoned the entire tax, ‘for reasons of national economic competitiveness’ 
relating to the financial crisis (GLOBE International 2013:171). The French government 
announced that it would push for an EU carbon border tax instead. 
As a result, French energy and carbon taxation is lower than in most of the other countries 
studied here, with the exception of Germany. Fuels used for generating electricity are not 
taxed (OECD 2013:101). Heat consumption is not taxed, and electricity consumption is taxed 
variously: residential users pay a lower tax rate than the standard rate applied to industrial 
users. Only 21% of French emissions are included in EU ETS. This relates to the dominance 
of nuclear power. France also has a modest target in the burden-sharing agreement, minus 
14% by 2020.  
The French prohibition of hydraulic fracturing (commonly known as fracking) has an 
emissions-regulating effect, although it was only partly backed by climate concerns (GLOBE 
International 2013:172). France has a tradition of voluntary agreements (AERES 2007). The 
agreement between the government and industry expired after the introduction of the ETS 
and the French government now merely supports voluntary action, requiring companies with 
more than 500 employees to report a carbon balance  (UNFCCC 2011:17).  
Germany first introduced energy taxes in in 1999/2002. From Table 3.3 we see that Germany 
has a middle position when it comes to energy taxation (EEW 2013a), as well as the lowest 
GHG tax level of the six countries. Biogasoline and biodiesel are generally taxed at the same 
rates as petrol and diesel, but a partial refund is offered (OECD 2013:107). Electricity is taxed, 
with differential tax rates applying to electricity used by different sectors. Certain steel and 
chemical processes are exempted from paying the standard tax rate on energy products.  
Almost 50% of the German emissions are included in ETS, the highest figure of the six 
countries assessed in this report. In addition, the effort-sharing agreement requires 14% GHG 
emissions reductions by 2020. Germany’s voluntary agreements coexist with the ETS and 
energy taxation. In 2010, 70% of industrial energy use in Germany was covered by voluntary 
agreements (Bertoldi and Rezessy 2010). These agreements set specific CO2 emissions targets 
for signatories. Germany separates EU ETS emissions from the voluntary agreement targets. 
The voluntary agreements focus on the targets and are combined with lucrative tax rebates, 
not specific actions to be implemented.  
Norway adopted a CO2 tax in 1991, and has since had as an overarching objective that 
Norway is to be a frontrunner country in adopting measures that can contribute to cost-
efficient emissions reductions (St. meld. 21 2011–2012: 95). Table 3.3 shows that Norway has 
the highest carbon tax by far, while the energy taxation level is relatively low. The carbon tax 
varies from sector to sectors. Norway joined the European Emission Trading System (ETS) in 
2008 and included aviation in the ETS from 2012. Tax rates have been revised, accounting for 
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the interaction between CO2 taxes and the ETS (OECD 2013:175). Norwegian petroleum 
activity pays CO2 tax, even though this is included in ETS. When Norway became part of EU 
ETS it lowered the CO2 tax for petroleum extraction in order to compensate for the price on 
ETS allowances. In 2013 the CO2 tax was doubled from NOK 200 to NOK 400. Table 3.3 
shows that 36% of Norwegian emissions are covered by the ETS. Norway is not included in 
the effort-sharing agreement. After the expansion of the ETS in 2013, almost 50% of 
Norway’s emissions are covered by the ETS, so that in total 80% are included in the ETS 
or/and covered by a carbon tax (St. meld. 21 2011–2012). 
Norway introduced a tax on electricity consumption as early as in 1951 (OECD 2013:175). A 
basic tax on mineral oils was introduced in 2000, but natural gas for certain purposes has a 
much lower level of taxation (St. meld. 21 2011–2012:95). The tax rates are differentiated, with 
households paying a much higher rate than industry. Norway has adopted two notable direct 
regulations of carbon: a flaring requirement offshore and a CCS requirement at new gas power 
plants (St. meld. St. 21 2011– 2012). 
Norway has a state aid scheme for industry energy efficiency, not directly related to carbon 
emissions (Enova 2013a).  Enova is a state en¬ter¬¬prise that primarily offers state aid to 
piecemeal low-cost energy-efficiency improve¬ments. Based on cost- efficiency principles, 
Enova has a range of support measures directed at industry: introduction of energy 
management programmes, pre-project funding and general support for energy-efficiency 
measures in industry and boiler plants. It also supports the replacement of fossil-fuel boilers in 
buildings (both households and the service sector). 
According to the Swedish government, energy and carbon taxation are important climate 
measures (see Miljödepartementet 2009). However, from Table 3.3 we see that Sweden has a 
lower tax rate on energy than Denmark and the UK, and a lower carbon tax than Norway and 
Denmark. On the other hand, Sweden has passed legislation that will reduce tax expenditures 
in its energy and CO2 taxes (OECD 2013:209). Industry and agriculture used to pay 30% of 
the standard tax rate on heating fuels, but this will increase to 60% as of 2015. In relation to 
the CO2 component, the tax refunds granted for diesel used as propellant in agricultural and 
forestry will decrease in 2013 and further in 2015. The CO2 tax is structured to complement 
the EU ETS. Consequently, the CO2 tax does not apply to plants covered by emission 
trading: it applies only to smaller plants. As the consumption of electricity does not generate 
CO2 emissions, it is not taxed (OECD 2013:207). 
Only 31% of the Swedish emissions are included in the ETS. However, Sweden has a rather 
tough target in the effort-sharing agreement: 17%. As will be discussed later, renewable energy 
and energy-efficiency measures are the most important measures to be applied in order to 
meet the non-ETS obligation.  
Since 2004, Sweden has had a voluntary agreement with energy-intensive industry on energy 
efficiency (Næringsutskottets betenkande 2012/13:NU4). Half of total industrial electricity use 
in Sweden is covered by this agreement. Industry actors that have introduced energy 
programmes are exempt from electricity taxation. As in Denmark, the Swedish voluntary 
agreement is quite specific about the precise actions that signatories are to undertake (Bertoldi 
and Rezessy 2010). In order to participate, industrial actors must be be engaged in energy-
intensive manufacturing. Recently, this agreement was altered: those industrial actors that 
28 
CICERO Report 2013:02 
National Climate Policy Ambitiousness: A Comparative Study of Denmark, France,Germany, Norway, 
Sweden and the UK 
participated before the year 2012 will still be exempt from taxation, but new actors will not be 
allowed to opt in (Næringsutskottets betenkande 2012/13:NU4).  
The UK has a broad and mixed portfolio of emissions-regulating instruments. In the late 
1990s the government launched an eco-tax reform, introducing a national emissions trading 
scheme as well as other economic climate instruments (Rayner and Jordan 2011:97). The 
current Cameron government appears to be just as committed to carbon pricing as the former 
Labour government: it has stated that ‘[p]utting a price on carbon is at the heart of the 
Government’s strategy for enabling the UK to reduce emissions over the long term’ (HM 
Treasury 2011). However, several non-market-based measures for emissions regulation 
coexists with measures that create a price on carbon. As of 2012, the EU ETS, the climate 
change levy, climate change agreements and the emission performance standard were the 
central measures for reducing emissions in the UK.  
Some 40% of UK emissions are covered by the EU ETS, and the country has a relatively high 
non-ETS target: minus 16 percent. (CCC 2012:18). When the coalition government entered 
office in 2010 they promised a floor price for carbon (HM Government 2010:16), which was 
introduced on 1 April 2013. The floor will start at around £16 per tonne of carbon dioxide 
(tCO2) and follow a linear path to target £30/t CO2 by 2020 (both in 2009 prices) (HM 
Treasury 2011:5). Carbon price support rates for 2013/2014 will be equivalent to 
£4.94/tCO2. Indicative rates for 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 are £7.28/tCO2 and 
£9.86/tCO2 respectively. The government has argued that the price floor will raise the price 
of electricity and hence reduce the need for national public support to renewable energy (HM 
Treasury 2011: 8). However, this measure may also distort the development of a harmonized 
European market for emission allowances. 
Table 3.3 shows that only Denmark has higher tax rates on energy than the UK. The British 
carbon tax – the climate change levy – is also comparatively high. This levy was introduced in 
2001 and applies to electricity and gas (whether liquefied or in the form of gas) consumed by 
British industry (Pearce 2005). Table 3.3 does not reflect the new rates that were introduced 
from 1 April 2013. The rate is significantly higher for electricity (0.524 pence per kilowatt 
hour) than for gas (0.182 pence per kilowatt hour) although it is highest for other liquid 
petroleum products (1.172 pence per kilogramme, all prices applies from 1 April 2013). Fuels 
used to produce electricity are not currently subject to the Climate Change Levy (OECD 
2013:226) 
Industries involved in voluntary climate-change agreements with the government are allowed 
to receive up to a 65% discount from the Climate Change Levy in return for meeting energy-
efficiency or carbon-saving targets set by the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) (Environment Agency 2013). As in Germany, the voluntary agreements focus on 
targets, not on specific measures, and industry is given tax rebates (Bertoldi and Rezessy 
2010:8). In order to avoid double-counting in relation to the ETS, the targets in the voluntary 
agreements are adjusted accordingly. The introduction of the carbon price floor on 1 April 
2013 entailed changes in the levy as well as in the voluntary agreements: the agreements will 
be extended to 2023, and the discount on electricity for participants will increase from 65 to 
80% from April 2013 (HM Treasury 2011:5). 
Upon entering office, the coalition government promised to establish an Emissions 
Performance Standard that would prevent the construction of new coal-fired power stations  
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unless equipped with sufficient CCS facilities to meet the emissions performance standard 
(HM Government 2010:16). The Energy Bill proposed in 2012, still under parliamentary 
debate, sets a statutory limit of  450g/kWh on the amount of annual CO2 emissions allowed 
from new fossil fuel-generating stations. Power stations under the 450g/kWh-based level 
would then be subject to that level until 2045 – a process known as ‘grandfathering’, which 
provides long-term certainty to gas investors. The idea is to provide a regulatory backstop on 
the amount of carbon emissions new fossil fuel plants can emit, and help to deliver on the 
government’s commitment to prevent the most carbon-intensive power stations from being 
built. Much of the technical detail of this regime is likely to be set out in secondary legislation 
after consultation. The emissions performance standard is a form of indirect state steering, 
leaving it to the commercial actors to develop and adopt technological solutions that ensure 
that emissions are below the threshold set by the government. 
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3.4 Renewable Energy Policies 
Table 3.4 summarizes core figures in the national renewable energy policies of the six 
countries. It describes medium- and long-term targets, EU targets, and the voluntary targets 
that the countries have taken on. The national electricity support schemes are also presented.  
Briefly put: feed-in schemes are designed to ensure long-term stability, so that commercial 
actors may spend the time and resources needed to refine those technologies in which they 
have greatest expertise (Sims et al. 2007:306). Feed-in schemes have two central design 
features: a purchase obligation, and a fixed tariff payment per unit of renewable electricity 
guaranteed over a long period (Jacobs 2012:43). The incentives for competitive behaviour and 
cost minimization are weak. In contrast, green certificate schemes are market-based, 
encouraging market actors to compete in developing the most profitable low-carbon projects 
(Commission 2008). In practice, the design of feed-in schemes as well as certificates can vary 
in many ways, but we will not go into detailed discussion here.   
Table 3.4 Renewable Energy Policies 
 
EU 2020 
target % of 
energy 
consumption 
Voluntary 
2020 
targets 
2050 target % of 
consumption 
Electricity support scheme 
 
Denmark 30 35 100 Feed-in premium 
France 23 23 - Feed-in tariffs 
Germany 18 18 80 Feed-in tariffs 
Norway 67.5 67.5 - Green Certificates 
Sweden 49 50 - Green Certificates 
UK 15 15 Decarbonization 
target postponed 
Feed-in, Contracts of Difference 
Sources: See text below 
EU has radically stepped up its engagement in renewable energy policy during the last decade, 
greatly enhancing its importance for national policymaking in this issue-area.  The Renewable 
Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) is the core of EU policy on renewable energy (European 
Parliament and Council 2009a). It provides Brussels with substantial authority as well as more 
incentives for technology development than the use of market measures.  
The aim is to increase the overall share of energy from renewable sources in gross final 
consumption of energy to 20% by 2020. Various types of renewable energy, in the form of 
electricity or heat applied for stationary purposes or for transportation, count towards 
fulfilment of the target. With regard to transport, ‘[e]ach member state shall ensure that the 
share of energy from renewable energy sources in all forms of transport in 2020 is at least 
10% of the final consumption of energy in transport in that member state’ (Article 3). If the 
overall volume of energy consumption is reduced, the size of the renewable energy percentage 
will increase. This implies that energy-efficiency improvements will contribute to achievement 
of the target. Most importantly, mandatory national targets are set for all member states. 
These individual targets are developed on the basis of the economic strength of each member 
state – not its technological potential for producing renewable energy. The various national 
renewable energy action plans show that member states have planned significant increases in 
energy efficiency, but are also heading for a shift in the annual increase in production of 
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renewable energy from 22 TWh/year for the period 2000–2008 to 52TWh/year for the period 
2008–2020 (EURELECTRIC 2011: 19). 
The Renewable Energy Directive clearly leans towards technology development. All member 
states are obliged to reach national targets for the share of renewable energy; further, ‘special 
attention can be given to sectors that suffer disproportionately from the absence of 
technological progress and economies of scale and therefore remain under-developed, but 
which, in the future, could significantly contribute to reaching the targets for 2020’ 
(2009/28/EC, Preamble 20). Each member state is obliged to report to the Commission on 
how it has ‘structured its support scheme to take into account renewable energy applications 
that give additional benefits in relation to other comparable applications, but may have higher 
costs (…)’ (2009/28/EC, Article 22). Clearly, the Directive is geared towards developing a 
range of new renewable energy technologies, even though this may entail high costs. 
It introduces three flexible mechanisms, designed for ‘facilitating cross-border support of 
energy from renewable sources without affecting national support schemes’ (Preamble 25). 
First, there is a mechanism to enable member states to make arrangements for statistical 
transfer to other member states, so that renewable energy produced in one country can be 
counted towards the target of another (Article 6). Second, the joint projects mechanism serves 
the same purpose, but involves collaboration throughout the planning process (Article 7). 
Third, the joint support scheme mechanism enables member states to ‘decide, on a voluntary 
basis, to join or partly coordinate their national support schemes. In such cases, a certain 
amount of energy from renewable sources produced in the territory of one participating 
Member State may count towards the national overall target of another participating Member 
State’ (Article 11). 
These mechanisms give member states some flexibility with respect to achieving their targets 
and enable the development of cross-national schemes, whether market-based or not. As we 
shall see, some actors have promoted the development of ‘green certificate’ schemes that 
oblige energy producers to offer their customers a certain quota of renewable energy and 
create a market of securities that the energy producers can buy if they do not provide the 
renewable energy quota themselves (see European Commission 2008j). However, the 
Renewables Directive does not require member states to develop such green certificate 
schemes or other market measures. The three mechanisms may facilitate various kinds of 
cross-border collaboration – but whether this underpins the development of a pan-European 
green certificate scheme or technology-development steering methods will depend on how the 
member states employ these mechanisms. Thus far, very few countries have set about using 
the mechanisms (Ragwitz et al. 2012). 
The Directive gives the Commission substantial possibilities to control and redirect national 
policies. Member states are instructed to develop ‘an indicative trajectory tracing a path 
towards the achievement of their final mandatory targets’ (Preamble 18). There is a detailed 
description of how the national renewables targets are to be measured; each member state is 
also obliged to adopt a national renewable energy action plan and report to the Commission 
every second year (Articles 4, 5). In June 2009 the Commission issued a highly detailed 
template for reporting, covering all kinds of administrative procedures, support measures, 
information campaigns and the like (European Commission 2009). The national action plans 
are to be evaluated by the Commission, which may interfere in almost any detail relating to a 
member state’s national policy on renewables (Article 4). However, it is up to the member 
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states to decide how and to what extent they will exploit the opening for flexibility offered by 
the mechanisms. 
Denmark has increased its new renewable energy production dramatically during the last 
decade. By 2010, 22% of Danish electricity consumption stemmed from wind power, and the 
government plans to more a double this share by 2020 (KEB 2011:22). Denmark has put 
efforts into the establishment of district heating, but electricity has recently gained increased 
interest. The current government argues that electricity is central for a low-carbon transition 
(KEB 2011:10). 
Denmark has as a long-term objective of achieving 100% renewables by 2050. To this end, the 
government has developed a range of sub-targets (KEB 2011:5, 19; KEB 2013):  
- 35% of energy consumption from renewables by 2020 (higher than the EU objective)  
- 50% of traditional electricity consumption to be based on wind power by 2020   
- ending coal-based electricity production by 2030  
- ending oil-based heating by 2030  
- 100% electricity and heating supply based on renewable energy in 2035: no use of gas 
for electricity and heating, but leaves out transport. 
Traditionally, Denmark has applied feed-in tariffs to support the development of renewable 
energy. Around the year 2000 there were discussions of shifting to a more market-based 
scheme. Eventually, Denmark continued with a feed-in premium scheme, introducing some 
more market-based elements. Denmark now applies a combination of fixed and sliding 
premiums. A maximum remuneration level (electricity price + fixed premium) is defined for 
most technologies, to avoid windfall profits (Ragwitz et al. 2012: 13). For instance, the cap on 
support for land-based wind power is 60 øre/kWh (KEB 2011:11). Moreover, the support 
level will be reduced by one unit for every unit the electricity price increases from 35 
øre/KWh (KEB 2011:11). For offshore wind, the premium level is determined by a tendering 
process.  
Denmark also has technology-specific support for various types of bioenergy and renewable 
heating. Recently, the support level for manure-based biogas production was stepped up 
(KEB 2011:10). This support will be reduced in line with the development of the natural gas 
price. Further, the government has initiated a range of task forces and assessment processes 
that will be finalized during 2013. Among the subjects to be assessed we find: the conditions 
for use of bioenergy and biogas in Denmark, future use of gas infrastructure, the role of 
district heating in the energy system, and the portfolio of energy transformation measures 
(KEB 2011:11, 15). Moreover, Denmark regulates the use of fossil fuel by banning the 
installation of gas- and oil-based boilers in new buildings (2013) and the installation of oil-
based boilers in existing buildings (from 2015) (KEB 2011:13).  
France has adopted a 23% renewable share by 2020 target (Loi Grenelle 1, 2009). This will 
entail doubling the production of renewable energy between 2008 and 2020, and specific 
targets have been developed for the various energy sources (MEDDE 2009:11). In his first 
major speech, President Hollande announced that France would reduce its carbon emissions 
substantially, in conjunction with reducing the share of nuclear power in the national energy 
mix from the current 75% to 50% by 2025 (GLOBE International 2013:172). The new 
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socialist government’s anti-nuclear policy has made the renewable energy objectives even 
more demanding.  
The French feed-in scheme is a central component in the strategy for reaching these targets 
(Jacobs 2012). It was introduced in 2001, with several alterations since then. Initially, hydro, 
wind, solar, biomass and biogas were eligible for feed-in payment (Jacobs 2012:47). Over the 
years, several more specific bioenergy categories have been added: a new category of less-
mature hydropower, including tidal and hydrokinetic power. Initially, only projects smaller 
than 12 MW could receive feed-in support, but the cap was later removed (Jacobs 2012:60). 
The tariff calculation method has changed. Initially the tariffs reflected the avoided costs for 
traditional electricity generation, but eventually came to represent the actual costs of 
generation. This has resulted in increased tariff levels (Jacobs 2012: 73–74). The duration of 
the tariff payment varies between 15 and 20 years (Jacobs 2012: 79). Feed-in costs are 
distributed evenly among all French electricity consumers, but energy-intensive industry is 
partly exempted (Jacobs 2012: 87-88). 
The French government has launched various tenders for renewable energy projects, including 
several large-scale biomass tenders (MEDDE 2009:11), tenders for construction of at least 
one solar power station in each region (MEDDE 2009:12), and a call for tenders for large-
scale solar. It also has a tendering plan for onshore and offshore wind power (UNFCCC 
2011:9). According to the French government, the pre-selection of sites for offshore wind 
power encourages local and public authorities to install solar panels (UNFCCC 2011:14–15). 
In addition, Grenelle II gave individuals the opportunity to sell electricity from the 
photovoltaic installations on their homes by feeding it back through the grid (GLOBE 
International 2013:173). 
Bioenergy plays a key role in French strategy on renewable energy policy. The first wood 
energy plan was launched in 2000 (Szarka 2008:136), involving tax credits to households that 
bought wood-burning stoves. The French government created a Renewable Heating Fund of 
1.2 billion euros for the period 2009–2013 to promote the use of renewable and recovery heat, 
including solar thermal, biomass and geothermal energy (MEDDE 2009:11; UNFCCC 
2011:14–15). The government also plans to modernize existing hydroelectric plants, issuing a 
call for tenders in which it selects operators based on energy-efficiency criteria and water 
quality improvement measures.  
Germany has long history of renewable energy development. Deployment of renewables grew 
ten times faster than the OECD average from 1990 to 2010 and now accounts for 20% of 
electricity output (Economist 2012).  Germany was among the first countries to adopt a feed-
in scheme. Interestingly, German renewable energy policy is not governed by the energy 
ministry, as in most other European countries. Around the year 2000, Germany’s Greens 
succeeded in getting responsibility for renewable energy transferred from the Ministry of 
Economics and Technology to the feed-in supportive Ministry of the Environment (ENDS 
2005).  
The German Energiewende has a long-term orientation, and is based on a series of detailed 
long-term targets. By 2020, renewable energies are to account for 18% of gross final energy 
consumption (BMU 2012:7). Thereafter, the German government will aim to have renewable 
energy sources account for the following proportions of gross final energy consumption: 30% 
by 2030, 45% by 2040 and 60% by 2050. By 2020, electricity generated from renewable energy 
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sources is to account for 35% of gross electricity consumption. After this, the aim is to 
increase the proportion of gross electricity consumption from renewable energy sources to 
50% by 2030, 65% by 2040 and 80% by 2050. 
The German Renewable Energy Act is the core policy measure. Wind power support in 
Germany has a special incentive structure, based on a ‘reference yield’ (Ragwitz et al. 2010:10-
11). Operators of onshore wind turbines receive a fixed level of support for the first five years 
after the plant has started operating. The law defines a ‘reference wind turbine’ as located at a 
site with a wind speed of 5.5 m/s at an elevation of 30 meters above sea level. Actual wind-
power projects are compared with this reference turbine, and that variance generates a 
reference yield. If a wind turbine produces at least 150% of this reference yield within its first 
five years of operation, the tariff level will be reduced for the remaining 15 years of support. 
However, for each 0.75% the generated electricity stays below the reference yield, the higher 
starting tariff will be paid for two further months. Thus, wind-power plants with average wind 
conditions receive the higher tariff for the full 20 years, while good wind sites will receive the 
reduced tariff after a certain number of years. This means that the use of wind energy to 
generate electricity is not limited to locations with particularly good wind conditions: also sites 
with less favourable conditions can be exploited. 
The German government has introduced some changes to the existing feed-in scheme, 
arguing that it will become ‘more market-oriented’ and that ‘the further expansion of 
renewable energies will be driven to a greater degree by markets’ (FMENCNS 2011:7). This 
applies particularly to photovoltaic energy. Photovoltaics currently contribute 9% of the 
electricity that falls under the feed-in law, but they account for 40% of its differential costs. At 
the same time, photovoltaics offer great potential for cutting costs and a steep technological 
learning curve. Introducing the “breathable cap” has substantially reinforced the annual 
degression in feed-in tariffs for photovoltaic power. The annual degression of 9% will now be 
ramped up as a function of growing market volumes, and from 2012 it may increase by up to 
12 percentage points.  
German consumers pay the costs generated by the feed-in scheme. Moreover, the high level 
of unstable renewable energy has distorted the traditional price-shaping signals in the energy 
market (European Energy Review 2012). These aspects have led to heated debate, even 
though the Energiewende still enjoys considerable public support. In the autumn of 2012, the 
Environment Ministry launched a broad dialogue aimed the further development of the 
Renewable Energy Act (Renewable Energy World 2013). But already in March, the 
Environment Minster and the Energy Minister together tabled a range of short-term 
adjustments and long-term reform elements. The short-term adjustments would reduce the 
support levels for several technologies, except photovoltaic. For the long term they proposed 
that new and existing solar and wind parks should contribute to the costs of the support 
programme, and that energy-intensive corporations should contribute more.  
Norway had hardly any renewable energy policy prior to the year 2000 (see Boasson 2011). 
Until then, 100% of its electricity supply came from large-scale hydro. As of 2010, gas power 
was supplying a minor share of the electricity, wind power as well as small hydro had been 
developed and the renewable share of the electricity supply was 96.9% (OED 2012:13). With 
regards to the total energy consumption (electricity, as well as heating and transport), the 
Norwegian renewable share in 2010 was 61%, according to the accounting procedures of the 
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EU Renewable Energy Directive, which does not take into account energy supply at offshore 
installations (OED 2012a:6).   
The Norwegian supports scheme for renewable electricity, introduced in 2001, was contested 
and failed to meet the target of 4 TWh wind power by 2010 (NVE 2012). Far more successful 
were the support measures for renewable heating. In the period 2002 to 2012, the government 
licenced district heating plants with production capacity corresponding to 4.1 TWh (OED 
2012a:5).  
In September 2009, Sweden and Norway agreed on the key principles for a common green 
certificate scheme, and in 2010 the two countries signed a binding agreement. Thus far, 
Norway and Sweden are the only countries that apply the flexibility mechanisms in the EU 
Renewable Energy Directive, opening up for the creation of common renewable energy 
support schemes (see Energimyndigheten 2005). The two countries have as a common 
objective to increase renewable electricity production by 26 TWh by 2020 (OED 2012). Each 
of the parties will be credited half of the new renewable electricity production from 2012 to 
2020. The certificate scheme is technology-neutral and includes hydro, as well as wind and 
bio-power. The scheme is planned to last until 2035. Norway as well as Sweden exempts 
energy-intensive industry from the system. In Sweden, the scheme primarily supports bio-
power and wind, while hydro dominates in Norway (Skrivarhaug 2013). The Swedish 
government expects an annual 4.5 million SEK in total turnover in the certificate market 
(Regjeringskansliet 2012:4).  
The most important Swedish measure, the certificate scheme, has already been introduced. 
Here we might note the Swedish parliament endorsed a green certificate scheme already in 
2002, and adopted the objective of increasing electric power production from renewables by 
10 TWh between 2002 and 2010. In 2006, the target was raised to 17 TWh from 2002 to 2016 
(Regjeringens proposisjon 2008:41). Two years later, the Swedish government raised it to 25 
TWh by 2020, and this was later reflected in the joint Swedish–Norwegian certificate scheme 
(OED 2011). Between 2002 and 2012, 15 TWh of new renewable energy were supported by 
the Swedish scheme (Skrivarhaug 2013). The price for certificates has varied between 140 and 
360 SEK. When Norway joined in January 2012, the price was at an all-time low of 140 SEK, 
but has since risen to 215 SEK.  
The Swedish government has a range of additional support measures, for instance 
considerable annual support for photovoltaic and biogas (Regjeringskansliet 2012:5). 
Moreover, the Swedish parliament has set the planning objective for windpower at 30 TWh in 
2020, of which 20 TWh is to be onshore and 10 TWh offshore (Regjeringskansliet 2012:4). 
The renewable energy policy of the UK has traditionally been a renewable electricity policy. It 
has been contested and has changed several times in the last twenty years, and is now about to 
change again. Since the early 1990s, UK governments have tried to develop market-based 
support schemes for renewable energy, without much success. The Renewables Obligation 
introduced in 2002 failed to achieve the target of 10% electricity from renewable sources by 
2010 (Rayner and Jordan 2011:101). When climate issues gained attention after 2006, policy 
on renewable energy shifted towards more of a technology development approach, 
introducing feed-in measures and other non-market measures (see Boasson and Wettestad 
2013).  
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The EU Renewables Directive commits UK to produce 15% of its energy from renewable 
sources by 2020. During 2011, the share of renewable energy increased from 3.2% to 3.8% of 
energy consumption, but the overall renewable share is still very low (DECCb 2012:17). 
However, the Climate Change Committee has expressed concern that offshore wind targets 
will not be met, since investments were only ‘one-third of the rate required annually by the 
end of the decade’ (CCC 2012:11).  
Initially, the Cameron government declared that it would set a 2030 decarbonization target for 
the power sectors, but this has been postponed until 2016. The government has argued that it 
will await the advice from the Committee on Climate Change on the fifth carbon budget, 
which covers the period up to 2030 (DECC 2012b:13). Although an overarching target for the 
sector is missing, Cameron’s coalition government has introduced a series of new measures. It 
has launched an Energy Market Reform with Contracts for Difference and the Capacity 
Market as main elements. This is a follow up of the government declaration: ‘We will establish 
a full system of feed-in tariffs in electricity – as well as the maintenance of banded Renewables 
Obligation Certificates’ (HM Government 2010:16). Contracts for Difference is a feed-in 
premium scheme, and generators with such contracts will sell their electricity to the market in 
the normal way. The Contract for Difference will then pay ‘the difference between an estimate 
of the market price and an estimate of the long term price needed to bring forward 
investments in a given technology’ (DECC 2012c). Hence, the returns for generators are 
stabilized at a fixed level, known as the ‘strike price’. Contracts for Difference will be offered 
for renewable energy, nuclear energy and fossil-fuel plants equipped with CCS facilities.  
The aim has been to design a support scheme that removes the generators’ long-term 
exposure to electricity price volatility, and lowers the capital costs of the necessary investment. 
Generators receive revenue from selling their electricity into the market as usual. In addition, 
when the market price is below the strike price, they will receive a top-up payment from 
suppliers for the additional amount. Conversely, if the market price is above the strike price, 
the generator must pay back the difference (DECC 2012b:14). The Energy Bill is expected to 
achieve Royal Assent in 2013. Neither the level of financial support that renewable 
technologies will attract under the new financial framework nor the details of the Contracts 
for Difference has yet been decided.   
Contracts for Difference will replace the existing Renewables Obligation as the main financial 
mechanism for large-scale renewable electricity generation (DECC 2012d). When introduced 
in 2002, it offered a single rate of 1 Renewables Obligation Certificate (ROC) per megawatt 
hour of eligible renewable electricity generated. In 2009, bands of support were introduced, 
allowing the Renewables Obligation to offer varied support levels by technology, reflecting 
differing levels of costs, potential and other factors. Reviews of banding levels were set for 
every four years; the levels of banded support for renewable electricity generation for the 
period 2013 to 2017 have not yet been determined. By 2017 the revised RO package could 
deliver as much as 79 TWh of renewable electricity per annum in the UK (DECC 2012b:17). 
Renewables Obligation will be fully replaced by Contracts for Difference after 2017. 
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3.5 Energy Efficiency Policy 
Energy efficiency is a complex issue. Energy efficiency improvements are measured in many 
different ways, and the EU as well as the countries studied here have adopted a whole range 
of measures. In the following we present the main strategies of EU and the six countries with 
a focus on the energy performance of buildings, energy certification of buildings in particular. 
Table 3.5 shows the overarching targets, the targets for buildings and the character of the 
certification schemes. 
Table 3.5 Energy Efficiency and Energy Policy for Buildings 
 Overarching 2020 targets Overarching 2050 
targets 
Economic 
instruments, 
buildings 
Instruments, 
industry 
Energy  
Certification 
 
EU 20% reductions by 2020 - -  - Market 
measure and 
advice 
Denmark 12% reduction in gross 
energy consumption 
compared with 2006  
New strategy 
awaited in 2013 
Taxes, some 
support 
measures,  
Voluntary 
agreement 
Primary 
consultation 
and advice  
France Increase energy efficiency 
by 2.5% annually by 2030 
- Many different 
state aid 
measures 
White 
certificates 
Primary 
consultation 
and advice 
Germany Decrease primary energy 
use by 20% compared to 
2010 
Decrease primary 
energy use by 50% 
compared to 2010 
Many different 
state aid 
measures 
Voluntary 
agreement 
Primary 
consultation 
and advice 
Norway Considerably lower energy 
use than with no measures  
Considerably lower 
energy use than 
with no measures 
Cost- efficient 
Enova support 
scheme 
Enova, cost-
efficient 
support 
Primary market 
measure 
Sweden 20% reduction in supplied 
energy 
 Taxes, many 
different state 
aid measures,  
Voluntary 
agreements 
Market 
measure and 
advice 
UK 196 TWh lower than in 
2009/11% lower than BAU 
 Many different 
state aid 
measures 
Voluntary 
agreements 
Primary 
consultation 
and advice 
(green deal) 
Sources: * Eurostat 2013c, prices form second half 2011. Other references are found in the text below. 
 
The EU has developed a rather encompassing energy efficiency policy, with the Energy 
Efficiency Directive, Directive 2012/27/EU (European Parliament and Council 2012) and the 
Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD), Directive 2010/317/EU (European 
Parliament and Council 2010) as core elements. Energy labelling and the Eco-design Directive 
are also significant, influencing appliance markets directly, but these will not be dealt it here.  
The 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive establishes a common EU framework of measures, and 
aims to ensure achievement of the 20% headline target and ‘to pave the way for further energy 
efficiency improvements’ (Art 1.3). Member states are to set indicative national targets for 
energy efficiency, expressed ‘in terms of an absolute level of primary energy consumption and 
final energy consumption in 2020’, and explain how the targets have been calculated. If the 
member states fail to develop sufficiently ambitious policies, the Commission can bring this 
up for discussion. 
The Energy Efficiency Directive contains a mix of market measures and technology 
development measures. Member states are required to set up an energy-efficiency obligation 
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scheme (Art. 7). The Directive promotes schemes in which energy distributors and/or retail 
energy sales companies are designated as obligated parties required to achieve a cumulative 
end-use energy savings target by 31 December 2020. The target shall be at least equivalent to 
achieving annual savings of 1.5% of the energy sales of the companies. However, member 
states may opt for alternative energy-efficiency strategies, and various alternative policy 
measures are mentioned. Member states shall notify their plans to the Commission, which 
may make suggestions for modifications.  
The Directive promotes a range of measures intended to provide energy costumers with good 
and updated information about their energy consumption – such as high-quality, cost-
effective, energy audits carried out by qualified experts or supervised by ‘independent 
authorities’, individual meters and appropriate billing information (Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11).  
These are market measures, aimed at influencing how the energy consumers act in the energy 
market. However, the Directive also underlines that these measures should be implemented in 
a cost-efficient way – which is in line with a ‘minimizing societal cost’ approach.  
The Energy Efficiency Directive has a strong focus on the energy performance of existing 
buildings. Each member state is required to establish, by April 2014, a long-term strategy for 
mobilizing investment in the renovation of the national stock of residential and commercial 
buildings and to update the strategy every third year (Art. 4). Public authorities are encouraged 
to lead by example, although the Directive specifies few exact requirements in this respect 
(Art. 5). For instance, at least 3% of the floor area of the central government’s buildings are to 
be energy-renovated each year and public bodies are encouraged to develop energy efficiency 
plans and systems for energy management.  
Some parts of the Energy Efficiency Directive duplicate the Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive (EPBD), adopted two years prior. EPBD has primarily a technology development 
character, but also involves market thinking. It has five main elements: a foundation for a 
holistic method for calculating the energy performance of buildings; requirements directed at 
national building codes; obligations on the regular control of heating and cooling systems; 
recommendations for increased use of national financial support measures; and a general 
outline for national energy certification of buildings. 
‘Technology-development’ steering is dominant in the EBPD. A holistic method for energy 
calculation provides the basis for all other measures. A key concept here is ‘cost optimal’, 
defined as ‘the energy performance level which leads to the lowest cost during the estimated 
economic lifecycle’ (Art. 2.14). In contrast to cost-efficiency considerations, cost-optimal 
calculations are to take the whole lifetime of the building into account. Such longer-term 
calculations will make costly measures appear more economically viable.The EPBD requires 
member states to apply minimum requirements to new buildings and building units, to 
existing buildings and building elements subject to major renovation, and to technical building 
systems whenever they are installed, replaced or upgraded (Art. 1).  
By 2020, all new buildings are to be nearly zero-energy; public buildings must fulfil this 
requirement by 2018 (Art. 9). Member states must develop national plans for ‘nearly zero-
energy buildings’, and ‘take measures such as the setting of targets in order to stimulate the 
transformation of buildings that are refurbished into nearly zero-energy buildings’. Interim 
targets are to be in place by 2015. Member states are encouraged to introduce financial 
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incentives in order to catalyse the energy performance (Art. 10). Every three years, member 
states shall draw up lists of existing and planned financial instruments.  
In contrast to the other elements in the EPBD, the energy performance certificates have a 
market flair. These certificates shall indicate the energy performance of a building or a 
building unit, and be calculated in accordance with the methodological requirements of the 
Directive (Art. 11). Member states are to issue certificates for all buildings or building units 
that are constructed, sold or rented out, or have useful floor area of over 500 m2 (to be 
lowered to 250 m2 in 2015) (Art. 12). The certificate shall figure in building advertisements in 
commercial media, and all buildings frequently visited by the public must display the certificate 
in a prominent place. 
Independent control systems are mandatory, in order to ensure the credibility of these 
certificates (Art. 18). In addition, the Commission shall by 2011 adopt a voluntary, common 
EU certification scheme for non-residential buildings (Art. 11). Similarly, the certificates may 
affect the market value of buildings. The certificates are also to include recommendations for 
‘cost-optimal or cost-effective’ improvement. Hence, energy certification is not only a market 
measure: it also provides people with technical guidance on how to enhance the energy 
performance of their buildings. 
However, the EPBD lacks clear, binding commitments, and core concepts like ‘nearly zero 
energy’ and ‘cost optimal’ are unclear. A draft issued in May 2011 indicates that member states 
will have considerable leeway to develop ‘cost-optimal energy calculation methods’ in 
accordance with their own preferences (European Commission 2011b). The Directive’s 
definition of a ‘nearly zero energy building’ is highly ambiguous: a ‘building that has a very 
high energy performance’ and its ‘nearly zero or very low amount of energy required should 
be covered to a very significant extent by renewable energy sources’ (Art. 2). Member states 
are free to interpret what this is to mean in practice. 
Denmark has a long and strong tradition as regards energy efficiency. Since 1980, the Danish 
economy has grown by 78%, while energy consumption has remained more or less constant 
(Energistyrelsen 2009). Denmark now aims for 12% reduction in gross energy consumption 
by 2020 compared with 2006 (KEB 2013). It aims to be one of the three most energy-efficient 
countries in the world by 2020. Energy taxation, presented in the emissions regulation section 
of this report, plays an important role in the energy-efficiency strategy. Denmark has adopted 
strict energy requirements in the building code; it  has a long tradition of energy certification 
of buildings and has an encompassing voluntary agreement with the energy industry.  
The Danish government highlights the energy performance of buildings as a key sector. 
Denmark was among the first European countries to develop energy requirements in its 
building codes and to offer extensive public funding for energy-efficiency measures 
(European Commission 1998, EuroAce 2010). Energy requirements were strengthened by 
25% in 2011 (Aggerholm et al. 2010).  
Denmark was an early adopter of a system for energy certification of buildings, and the EU 
regulation is partly modelled on the Danish system. However, the Danish system was designed 
primarily to function as a scheme for control of building construction, not as a market 
scheme. The Danish certification scheme was thoroughly revised when the EPBD recast was 
implemented in 2011 (Aggerholm et al. 2010). According to Danish officials ‘the real benefit 
of the EP certificate is in the recommendations given to the building owner’ (Aggerholm et al. 
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2010:2). The Danish scheme includes giving comprehensive advice to building owners, and 
also fulfils the EU Directive’s requirements about disclosing the certificate when buildings are 
sold or rented. The certification is performed by experts, using standardized web tools. The 
calculation methodology for certificates is the same as with the building regulations. Of the 
countries studied here, only Denmark has an independent control system, designed as random 
sampling.  
A new support scheme for green renovation was recently introduced. 500 million Danish 
kroner a year will be used for this scheme in 2013 and in 2014 (KEB 2011). Otherwise, the 
system for state support and energy advice has been changed several times during the last 
decade, and the government is currently assessing the need for such state activities in addition 
to the activities of the energy companies (Energistyrelsen 2011, Energistyrelsen 2012).  
Since the mid-2000s, the French government has stated that that energy efficiency is the main 
objective of the country’s energy policy, and that the main priorities are reducing energy 
consumption and GHG emissions from buildings (UNFCCC 2011:15; Szarka 2008:134). 
France has introduced various energy-efficiency measures during the last decade, improved 
energy requirements in its building codes, financial instruments directed at the energy 
performance of buildings, building renovation projects and tradable white certificates.  
At the national level, France has set the target of increasing energy efficiency by 2.0% each 
year until 2015 and by 2.5% per year by 2030 (UNFCCC 2011:12). The government has also 
adopted reduction targets for existing buildings (38% reduction of energy consumption by 
2020 compared with 2007 levels) and new buildings (all new buildings are to be positive 
energy buildings by 2020) and a package of regulatory, financial and information measures for 
fulfilling the targets (UNFCCC 2011:15–16).   
New thermal regulations for the residential sector were introduced in 2005, requiring 15% 
improvement in the energy performance of new buildings. From 2020, all new constructions 
must have primary energy consumption lower than the amount of renewable energy produced 
in these constructions. France has also introduced energy certification. These regulations have 
been revised, and buildings constructed after 2012 must have a primary energy consumption 
of less than 50kWh/m2/year on average (MEDDE 2009:9). It is mandatory to display the 
energy performance certificate of buildings in real estate agencies (UNFCCC 2011:16) 
France has developed several financial instruments aimed at improving the energy 
performance of buildings. There is a zero-interest loan programme for first-time home buyers, 
a ‘sustainable development’ and a tax credit system aimed at speeding up light-thermal 
renovation, subsidies for energy audits and a social housing renovation programme aimed at 
enabling the annual renovation of 70,000 dwellings in the period 2011 to 2020 (GLOBE 
International 2013:176, MEDDE 2009:9 UNFCCC 2011:12).  
In 2006, France introduced tradable white certificates, or ‘certificates of energy savings’, as 
they are known in France (GLOBE International 2013:179, (MEDDE 2009:11). White 
certificates are energy saving obligations imposed on certain categories of energy market 
operators eventually coupled with a trading system for energy-efficiency measures that can 
result in certified energy savings (Bertoldi and Rezessy 2009). The French system obliges 
energy suppliers (electricity, gas, domestic fuel retailers etc.) to make energy savings. The first 
phase of the scheme lasted from 2006 to 2009; the second phase ran from 2011 to 2013 
(UNFCCC 2011:10). The objective for energy savings was set at 54 TWh (for 2006–2009) 
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through individual targets for suppliers. Today the scheme is considered a success, with 65 
TWh of energy savings delivered during that period. The scheme covered energy suppliers but 
excluded transport fuel suppliers. A second phase of the energy-efficiency certificate scheme 
(2011–2013) includes transport fuel suppliers and sets a target of 345 TWh cumulative energy 
savings over the period 2011–2013.  
Germany has adopted both short- and long-term energy-efficiency objectives. By 2020 
primary energy consumption is to be 20% lower than in 2008, and 50% lower by 2050. This 
calls for an annual average gain in energy productivity of 2.1%, based on final energy 
consumption. Germany seeks to cut electricity consumption by around 10% by 2020 and 25% 
by 2050, as compared with 2008 (FMENCNS 2011:5).  
By the mid-1990s, Germany had developed ambitious building codes and extensive public 
funding of energy improvements (European Commission 1998; EuroAce 2010). In the early 
2000s, Germany introduced changes in its regulations concerning the application of primary 
energy calculations, a move that promoted also the use of renewable energy, not only energy 
efficiency (ENDS 2001; ENDS 2002). The passive house movement is strong in Germany, 
although actual construction of such buildings has remained a marginal phenomenon. 
According to officials in the German government, the first version of the EPBD ‘had scarcely 
any effect in Germany’, since the obligation for national requirements was already ‘more than 
met in advance’ (Schettler-Köhler and Kunkel 2010:9). Germany developed a range of new 
energy-efficiency regulations and measures in the 2005–2010 period, but few new policy 
elements have been introduced after 2010 (EEW 2013).  
Concerning energy requirements for buildings, Germany tightened its requirements by 30% in 
connection with implementation of the first EPBD (Schettler-Köhler and Kunkel 2010; Schild 
and al. 2010). A scientific study of cost effectiveness must precede every tightening in the law, 
so German officials have argued that ‘the basic idea of the “cost optimal level” has therefore 
been anticipated’ (Schettler-Köhler and Kunkel 2010:10). Germany applies two methodologies 
for energy calculation: one list of requirements for each building component, and one holistic 
approach.  
Germany introduced an Energy Performance Certificate scheme in 2002 (Schettler-Köhler 
and Kunkel 2010). The certificate scheme has been changed several times since. In line with 
the energy performance directive and European standards (CEN), Germany has developed a 
holistic calculation method, based on energy demand.  An energy certificate can be issued 
exclusively on the basis of calculated energy demand, but consumption data may also be used. 
The certificate may also report the building’s CO2 emissions. Energy performance certificates 
are mandatory at the time of sale or lease, and contain improvement recommendations (EEW 
2013a).  
In order to keep the costs of issuing certificates low, Germany has not established a central 
register; neither has the government approved any official software for the certificates. 
Developers are free actors on the market. The certifiers are required to include certain 
qualifications, with less strict requirements for residential than commercial buildings. Germany 
has not introduced independent control systems. Energy certificates are to be shown upon 
request and are not required in building advertisements (EEW 2013a). 
German has an encompassing energy-efficiency state aid system (Schettler-Köhler and Kunkel 
2010). In 2011, the federal government had 12 different support programmes, promoting 
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particularly efficient new buildings, refurbishment measures in existing buildings, installation 
and use of solar-thermal, biomass and heat pumps, and on-site energy consulting (see BMU 
2010: 85–97). Most of the programmes are administered by the Development Loan Bank, 
KfW Bankengruppe. All costs caused directly by the energy-saving measures are eligible for 
support (Schettler-Köhler and Kunkel 2010). State aid is granted on the condition that all 
measures are undertaken by specialized contractors. An approved energy consultant must 
confirm that the refurbishment contributes to energy improvements. In general, the level of 
support increases with the level of energy performance achieved (EEW 2013a). 
There is a big market for energy performance contracts in Germany. In order to provide end-
users with a better overview of the market, the recently created Federal Office for Energy 
Efficiency is currently preparing proposals on how to develop it further. FMENCNS 
(2011:11). Germany has also launched white certificate pilot project. Moreover, the recent 
increase in energy prices for consumers as a result of the feed-in scheme has led to greater 
attention to energy efficiency (Schreurs 2012:38). 
The volume of the Norwegian energy policy for buildings has increased considerably since 
2000. Since that year, the overarching objective has been for energy consumption to be 
considerably lower than if no policy measures had been introduced. In November 2012, a 
specific target for buildings was introduced: by 2020, measures directed at buildings shall have 
served to reduced their energy consumption by 15 TWh (OED 2012b).  
Norway has developed four series of measures, administered by the State Housing Bank, the 
Ministry of Local and Regional Development, Enova and the Energy Directorate. The State 
Housing Bank has worked together with dwelling producers on developing low-energy 
buildings, granting state aid to innovative energy-enhancing techniques, and technol-ogies for 
building construction. Central measures are state aid and information campaigns (see e.g. 
Lavenergiboliger 2009). The Housing Bank grants support on the basis of technological, not 
personal economic, criteria (Husbanken 2003). In 2006/07, close to 40% of the loans of the 
Housing Bank were for dwellings with improved energy qualities (Husbanken 2006). In the 
early 2000s, it was set as an objective that all new buildings in 2010 should require half as 
much energy as that prescribed in the 1997 building code (KRD 2005:18, St. meld. nr. 23 
2003–2004:19). This objective has not been updated since.  
Norway’s Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (KRD) has developed a 
building code with technology standard characteristics. The energy requirements of the 
building code regulate which techniques and technologies may be applied in building 
construction. New energy requirements were introduced in 2007, aimed at ensuring that new 
and renovated buildings used 25% less energy than required in the 1997 building code (KRD 
2007). The new requirements were first voluntary, but became binding for all new buildings 
from 2010.  Whereas the previous building code had merely regulated the thermal quality of 
certain construction components (floor, walls, roof), the new code regulates all the features 
that contribute to the total energy consumption of a building. The code is based on a holistic 
understanding of the joint energy performance of all the characteristics of the building. A top 
priority is high thermal quality of the building shell, entailing a high-density construction 
whereby all building components (roof, floors, walls, windows etc.) must meet certain 
standards as to insulation. Poor thermal quality of the building shell cannot be compensated 
by installing in-house energy-producing equipment, like heat pumps and solar panels.  
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The regulations are to be made more stringent every five years, aimed at a passive house 
standard (or some other demanding holistic standard) in all new buildings from 2020 (Innst.S. 
nr. 145 2007–2008:25). In addition, ‘the building design shall ensure that a substan-tial part of 
the heating can be covered by other energy supplies than electricity and/or fossil fuels’ (KRD 
2007). Oil-burning furnaces are prohibited in new buildings, and minimum 60% of the heating 
in buildings larger than 500m2 is to be based on other energy carriers than electricity or fossil 
fuels (KRD 2010). For buildings of less than 500 m2, 40% is sufficient. This requirement may 
be set aside if calculations show that this would lead to extra costs when the building’s full 
lifetime is taken into account.  In 2012, the parliament determined that fossil fuels were not to 
be used for heating after 2020 (Innst. 390 S 2011–2012:20) 
A cost-minimizing state funding scheme for buildings has been developed by Enova, which is 
financed by an energy fund. In 2012, the Norwegian parliament decided to increase the 
funding of energy efficiency and district heating through Enova, by doubling the size of the 
energy fund from 25 billion NOK 50 billion NOK (Enova 2003b).  Enova is supplied 
annually with profits from the fund, in 2012 receiving 996 million NOK from the fund. Thus 
Enova does not apply the holistic approach found in the other measures, but focuses instead 
on specific building components, primarily target¬ing the largest commer¬cial actors in non-
residential construction (Riksrevisjonen 2010a:44). Enova has offered invest¬ment support to 
comprehensive energy agreements with major building developers/managers (whereby the 
actors commit to achieving a certain volume of saved energy) and energy-efficiency 
investments in build¬ings (Enova 2009a). Societal cost-minimizing criteria – not technological 
criteria – determine the kind of support that is given. Only those applicants that produce the 
highest energy surplus seen in relation to the support needed will be granted state aid (Riks-
revisjonen 2010a:58–59).  No projects that are profitable at the outset will be supported.  
The energy certification scheme for buildings operated by the Energy Direc¬tor¬ate is a 
market instrument (NVE 2010; Ot. prp. nr. 24 2008–2009). Certification is required of all 
large non-residential buildings and other buildings that are rented or sold. The certificate will 
disclose information to the building market that may affect pricing signals. The energy 
certificate consists of two scales: one for the energy quality of the building, and one for 
heating solutions in the building. Calculation of the energy quality of the building differs from 
the holistic calculation approaches of the building code by favouring high-quality energy 
(electricity) over the low-quality energy provided by district heating or on-site bioenergy 
burners.  Energy experts are to be involved in the certification of non-residential buildings; 
residential building certification is ensured by the building owner, facilitated by a web tool.  
Sweden has a long tradition of energy-efficiency policy, stemming from the oil crisis in the 
1970s (Fuglseth 2008:44). Energy intensity, measured in kWh/SEK, almost doubled between 
1993 and 2010 (Regjeringskansliet 2011:13). Sweden has as an overarching objective that 
energy intensity, measured as supplied energy per GDP, is to decrease 20% by 2020 compared 
with 2008. Sub-targets for buildings have also been developed. The government aims to 
reduce the energy used to heat dwellings and public/commercial premises by 20% by 2020, 
and by 50% by 2050 compared with 1995 levels (Regjeringskansliet 2011:11). Moreover, 
building mass is no longer to be dependent on fossil fuels in 2020, and the use of renewable 
energy is to increase continuously.  
As discussed in the section on emissions regulation, Swedish energy taxation initially had a 
fiscal motivation, but has since become a very important component of the country’s energy-
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efficiency policy (Regjeringskansliet 2011:15–16). Moreover, Sweden introduced an energy-
efficiency programme in 1997, and the funding allocated to this programme has increased 
gradually ever since. Since 2010, energy-efficiency activity at the municipal and regional levels 
has gained greater attention and more funding (Regjeringskansliet 2011:15–20). All 290 local 
municipalities in Sweden provide energy-efficiency consultancy, and the county municipalities 
have encompassing energy-efficiency strategies and activities. The Swedish state funds local as 
well as regional activities, and the Swedish Energy Directorate offers training and ensures 
coordination of local activities. In addition, various agencies under the national government 
offer support measures for non-fossil fuel and renewable electricity and heating systems in 
buildings; several information campaigns have also been launched (Regjeringskansliet 
2011:27–31).   
In 2011, new energy regulations in the building code were introduced, entailing 20% stricter 
energy requirements (Regjeringskansliet 2011:25). The Swedish system of energy certification 
of buildings was recently revised. The certification is performed by independent experts (Hjort 
et al. 2010:1). This led, inter alia, to a visual certification that was similar to the practice in 
most other European countries. Sweden follows the requirements as to disclosing the 
certificates when buildings are sold, but mainly as an information and consultancy measure 
(Regjeringskansliet 2011:15–26).   
Turning to the UK, we note that energy-efficiency policy has gained in importance. Initially, 
energy efficiency played a minor role in British climate policy, with the government regarding 
it more as a ‘no-cost option’ (Rayner and Jordan 2011: 102). In the course of the past decade, 
however, the government has initiated many energy-efficiency measures, with a specific focus 
on the energy performance of buildings. Indeed, this now appears to have top priority in 
British climate policy. There have been many adjustments and changes also in this policy area 
during the last decade. Most prominently, the UK initially had a white certificate scheme, 
although there was not much trading in this system. This was recently replaced by other 
energy-efficiency measures. As of early 2013, the most important measures were the Green 
Deal, the Energy Company Obligation, and energy requirements in the building regulations.  
Since the early 1990s, the UK has gradually upgraded the energy requirements in its national 
building code. New regulations were introduced in 2006, with average energy performance 
improvements of 20% compared to the 2002 regulations. Traditionally, British energy 
regulations have primarily targeted new buildings (DECC 2009:47). Responsibility for 
developing energy certification scheme has laid with the regional authorities in England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (Woods 2010). Hence, the country does not have one 
coherent scheme, but different schemes with different measurement methods and varying 
focus on market changes and energy consulting. However, the national government has 
launched the Green Deal scheme, based on some on energy certification elements but with a 
much stronger coupling to financial support measures.  
Green Deal provides advice on energy efficiency and a funding mechanism for homeowners 
and landlords (see DECC 2009:47). It replaces the domestic energy-efficiency obligation and 
the ‘Home Information Pack’, which were the main policies aimed at improving the energy 
efficiency of existing homes in the period 2002–2012. Green Deal is the UK version of the 
energy certification required by the EU Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. The 
Green Deal scheme is designed to create a market for energy-service providers, not to 
influence the real estate market. The certificate as such has no prominent place in the scheme: 
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the objective is not primarily to ensure that the price of buildings reflects their energy 
performance, but rather to incentivize improvements in energy performance more directly.    
Green Deal has four components (HM Government 2010:16; UK Government 2013). First, 
this scheme enables homeowners to get an assessment of their property to see what 
improvements can be made and how much could be saved on energy bills. Second, the 
homeowner/landlord can choose a Green Deal provider to conduct the work. Third, if the 
homeowner/landlord decides to go ahead with the improvements, a Green Deal Plan must be 
signed: this is a contract between homeowner/landlord and the Green Deal provider, 
specifying what work will be done and how much it will cost. The provider will then arrange 
for a Green Deal installer to do the work. Various measures are approved to receive funding 
under the Green Deal, covering insulation, heating and hot water, glazing and micro-
generation (decentralized renewable energy installed on-site). Green Deal packages can include 
energy efficiency, renewable heat and energy-generation products together (Energy Saving 
Trust 2013). Green Deals also apply for commercial buildings; for the non-domestic sector, 
lighting, mechanical ventilation and heat recovery measures can also be covered.   
Once the work is done, instalments will be paid off through the electricity bill. A total of 
£125m has been earmarked for the energy-efficiency incentive (EdieEnergy 2013). Although 
the cost of the improvements is to be repaid, this is not a conventional personal loan as the 
charge is attached to the electricity meter in one’s home and is repaid through the regular 
electricity bill. If house ownership changes, the new occupant will pick up the charge while 
also benefiting from a more energy-efficient property. Interest will be charged on these 
payments, but the rate will be fixed, and the homeowner/landlord will be shown a full 
schedule of all payments before signing up to the plan.  
As an extra Green Deal incentive to landlords, it has been decided that from April 2018, it will 
be unlawful to rent out residential or business premises that do not satisfy a minimum energy-
efficiency standard – the intention is for this to be set at energy performance certificate rating 
'E' (DECC 2013).  
The Energy Company Obligation for the UK’s major six energy suppliers was launched in 
early 2013 (Energy Saving Trust 2013). It is in three parts, all focusing on low-income and 
vulnerable households: the Affordable Warmth Obligation provides heating and hot water 
saving measures, insulation, glazing and micro-generation technologies (except PV); the 
Carbon Saving Obligation provides funding to insulate solid-walled properties and those with 
‘hard-to-treat’ cavity walls; and thirdly, the Carbon Saving Communities Obligation provides 
insulation and glazing measures to people living in the lowest 15% of the UK's most deprived 
areas. Through this measure, the government aims to help 230,000 low-income households or 
those in low-income areas. 
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4 Comparative Assessment 
4.1 Assessing GHG Emissions Reduction Objectives 
We start with the overarching climate objectives of the six countries studied here. Table 4.1 
sums up the ambitiousness criteria for the three dimensions and the country rankings.  
Table 4.1 Ranking of Emissions Reduction Targets 
Ambitiousness 
dimension 
Components 
 
Market Minimizing 
societal cost 
Technical development 
Geographical focus  Global  Global  National  
Target structure  Flexible Flexible  Detailed interim-targets leading up 
to 2050 
Ranking  (1st Sweden) 
(2nd Norway) 
1st Sweden 
2nd Norway 
1st UK and Germany 
2nd Denmark 
3rd France 
We see that the six countries fall rather neatly into two groups: Denmark, France, Germany 
and the UK, which have all developed national GHG emission reduction targets; and then 
Norway and Sweden, which have developed carbon neutrality targets. Countries in both 
groups participate in the ETS, so they may all contribute to emission reductions in other 
countries. However, Norway and Sweden pay greater attention to emission reductions abroad, 
while the UK, Germany, Denmark and France have a national focus in their target-setting. 
Moreover, Norway and Sweden have developed rather flexible target structures, with specific 
year-2020 targets, but lack long-term targets. The other four have developed somewhat more 
detailed interim targets leading up 2050.  
The Swedish/ Norwegian approach is closest to the two dimensions of ambitiousness 
focusing on economic criteria, Market and Minimizing Societal Costs. According to these 
ambitiousness dimensions, emissions should be cut where the costs are lowest for society 
and/or for corporate actors. Norway has declared its intention to become a low-carbon 
society; Sweden, too, with its GHG emissions targets also paying attention to emissions 
reductions abroad. Note that national petroleum independence also is part of the Swedish 
climate strategy. Both countries phrase their objectives in terms of carbon neutrality. Earlier, 
Norway specified that that 2/3 of the emissions reductions were to be achieved domestically 
by 2020. Sweden has declared that 7 out of 20 million in reductions by 2020 are to be 
effectuated abroad. This is in practice about 1/3, so the objective is rather similar to that of 
Norway, although the status of the Norwegian target is unclear at the moment. By 2020 
Sweden aims for a 40% reduction in global emissions, whereas Norway’s aim is only 30% – so 
Sweden appears to be more ambitious than Norway as regards achievements by the year 2020. 
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The emission-target structures can be said to be in accordance with both dimensions, but they 
are ranked according to only one of them: Minimizing Societal Costs. This is done in order to 
avoid double counting when we summarize the total scores of the two countries.  
The technology development approach pays more attention to national reduction of emissions 
and the importance of leading by example: the rationale is that if a country shows that it can 
cut its emissions drastically, other countries will follow its example. France is clearly the least 
ambitious in the Technology Development group, with its lower overarching target for 2050 
and less specific interim targets for reaching this target. Denmark has an ambitious 2040 
target, but no long-term interim targets. The UK has developed the most detailed and specific 
portfolio of interim targets towards 2025, but is less specific about the period after 2025. 
Germany stands out here, with its interim targets for the whole period to 2050. However, the 
standing of the UK is strengthened by its independent expert group that regularly reviews 
climate policy and has a long-term view. Hence, Germany and the UK emerge as the leaders 
of ambitiousness in this group, followed by Denmark, with France trailing behind.  
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4.2 Assessing GHG Emissions Regulations 
Turning to Emissions Regulations, we must bear in mind that EU ETS is the most important 
GHG regulatory measure in EU and EEA countries. Even though CO2 prices are low at 
present, there is reason to expect that the system will become more important over time as the 
number of allowances is gradually reduced and as economic recovery changes the price 
development. Moreover, there is no reason to expect that the system will fail to meet the 2020 
emission reduction limit (21% reduction). This EU measure fits best with the market 
dimension of ambitiousness: it creates an economic incentive, but industries with special 
economic concerns, like the energy-intensive industries, can be granted exemptions.  
All six countries, with the notable exception of France, apply a wide range of additional 
emission reduction measures. The UK applies measures in all categories in Table 3.3, but also 
Sweden and Denmark have introduced many measures. Most of the countries apply measures 
that are favoured by more than one of the three ambitiousness dimensions, so they do not fall 
as neatly into groups as they did with GHG emissions objectives. Still, a pattern emerges when 
we focus on the most striking and important elements of their emission reduction regulations. 
Table 4.2 Ranking of GHG Emissions Regulations 
Ambitiousness 
dimension 
Criteria 
 
Market Minimizing societal 
cost 
Technical 
development 
Number of measures   Not important  Few Many 
Favoured measure   Combinations of voluntary 
agreements and GHG 
emissions pricing  
GHG emissions pricing 
adjusted to ETS 
Emissions performance 
regulations and energy 
taxation 
Ranking   1st Sweden  1st Norway 1st UK 
2nd Denmark 
3rd Germany 
4th France 
The market approach values a combination of voluntary agreements and GHG emission 
pricing. Direct regulations contrast with this approach, since they reduce the leeway available 
to market actors. Denmark, Sweden and the UK combine voluntary agreements and carbon 
taxation. However, the UK also applies a wide range of measures that clearly fall outside this 
dimension, so it will not be categorized it in accordance to this dimension. Swedish carbon 
regulations profile fits rather well with this dimension, even though its extensive use of energy 
taxation is an anomaly. This reservation applies even more to Denmark, with its very high 
level of energy taxation. Hence Denmark is not ranked in this group. Norway has the highest 
carbon taxation rate; but, since it does not apply voluntary agreements it would nonetheless 
get a low score according to this dimension, and hence is not ranked here. As mentioned, the 
EU ETS gets a high score on this dimension, so the EU would have been placed in this group 
if it had been included in the ranking. Sweden is the only country that fits with the market 
view, and thus achieves a number one score along this dimension.  
To achieve a high ranking according to the Minimizing Societal Cost dimension, a country 
must use carbon taxation as the dominant measure, carefully adjusted to the ETS. Norway is 
the country that best fits this description, although its moderate use of energy taxation and the 
direct regulation of flaring and CCS use in gas power stations have hindered it in acting as a 
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very clear leader along this dimension. Still, as the only actor that falls into this category, it is 
given a number one position.  
Turning to the Technology Development view on ambitiousness, we will expect considerable 
use of energy taxation and emissions performance regulation. Moreover, use of regulatory 
elements from the other dimensions is less of a drawback, according to this view on climate 
policy. Most notably, this dimension favours complex and many-faceted regulatory styles. The 
UK stands out as a leader according to these criteria. It applies the full range of measures, but 
its relatively high energy taxation and the 450 g/kWh emission limit on electricity plants are 
particularly important. Denmark gets a second-best score, due to its record high energy 
taxation. Germany follows, but the low level of regulatory measures gives it a rather weak 
position. Because it has higher energy taxes than France it nonetheless gets the third place. 
Due to the ban on fracking, France is placed in this category, but due to its low energy taxes it 
is ranked last in the group. 
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4.3 Assessing Renewable Energy Policies  
Renewable energy policy has many elements. This report has focused on target-setting and 
support schemes for renewable energy electricity, so the following discussion of ambitiousness 
will be based on these two elements.  
Table 4.3 Ranking of Renewable Energy Policies 
Ambitious-
ness 
dimension 
Criteria 
 
Market Minimizing societal 
cost 
Technical 
development 
Kind of measure   Green Certificate Scheme  No support measures (rather 
rely on emissions pricing), 
cost-efficient state aid as a 
second best option.  
Feed-in schemes 
Target structure   Short- and medium-term targets   No targets Detailed short-, medium- 
and long-term targets 
Ranking   1st Sweden 
1st  Norway 
- 1st Denmark and Germany 
2nd UK 
3rd France  
A renewable energy policy will get a high market ambitiousness score if it applies green 
certificate schemes; and having ambitious short-term targets is an advantage for creating stable 
conditions for the functioning of the scheme. However, 2050 targets are less relevance in this 
perspective. Norway and Sweden are the only ones that qualify for assessment in relation to 
this dimension. It is not possible to distinguish between the two countries here, since they 
participate in the same scheme and have similar objectives. Hence they are both classified as 
leaders in this group.  
The Minimizing Societal Cost perspective rejects an active renewable energy policy: GHG 
price setting should be the only regulatory measure that creates incentives for renewable 
energy deployment. All kinds of target-setting will influence the effect of GHG prices, 
established by the ETS, in a negative way. If renewable energy nonetheless should get any 
support it should be done in a fashion that ensures that no projects that are profitable at 
outset receive funding and that only the least costly projects are realized. Neither feed-in nor 
green certificate schemes fit these criteria. Hence, none of the actors’ renewable energy 
policies fit with this dimension of ambitiousness.  
Turning to Technology Development, high objectives, long-term objectives and ambitious 
feed-in schemes are important criteria. Note that the EU policy fits rather well with this 
dimension. Moreover, four countries fall into this category: Denmark, France, Germany and 
the UK, all of which have feed-in schemes. Denmark and Germany stand out here: Denmark 
has adopted a 2020 target more ambitious than required by the EU and a very ambitious 2050 
target. Also Germany has developed detailed interim targets and ambitious long-term targets. 
The UK gets credit for having grand ambitions of increasing its renewable energy production. 
Because it lacks a formal long-term target and there is considerable uncertainty relating to the 
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new support scheme, the UK scores lower than Germany and Denmark. France is lagging 
behind, without long-term targets or ambitions of gradually improving its support scheme.  
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4.4 Assessing Energy Efficiency Policy  
We see more national creativity and variation in policy measures in relation to energy 
efficiency than in any other issue area. Lack of common measurement methods and modes of 
target-setting make it very challenging to compare the national policies, but the three 
dimensions nonetheless enable us to detect some patterns. Note that the energy-efficiency 
measures have a certain overlap with emissions regulations, especially since energy taxation 
and voluntary agreements play a role in both issue-areas.  
Table 4.4 Ranking Energy Efficiency Policy  
Ambitiousness 
dimension 
Criteria 
 
Market Minimizing societal 
cost 
Technical 
development 
Measures Tradable white certificates and 
voluntary agreements, energy 
certification designed to influence 
price developments in markets 
Preferably no measures. 
Cost-efficient state aid and 
low-cost information 
measures if profitable 
energy-efficiency measures 
remain un-realized.  
State aid based on technical 
criteria, energy requirements 
in building codes, and 
detailed, targeted 
information and training 
measures. 
Target structure   Short- and medium-term targets   No targets Detailed short-, medium- 
and long-term targets 
Ranking   1st Sweden 
 
1st Norway 
 
1st Germany 
2nd UK and Denmark 
3rd France 
According to a Market view, clear short- and medium-term targets are advantageous, taxation 
should be combined with state aid measures, industry should be included in a tradable white 
certificates scheme or voluntary agreements and the energy certification of buildings should be 
designed as a market measure. Sweden has the clearest fit with this approach: a clear 2020-
target, combining energy taxation with various state measures, a voluntary agreement and a 
certificate scheme that functions primarily as a market measure. France has a white certificate 
scheme that fits well with this perspective, but otherwise it has not adopted market measures. 
Hence, Sweden is the only country that is assessed in accordance to this category.    
The Minimizing Societal Cost view stands out due the importance of simplicity in policy 
strategy. The prime position along this perspective involves relying on GHG pricing and 
developing as few additional measures as possible. However, it is in accordance with this 
perspective to argue that since not all good energy-efficiency measures are profitable, state aid 
may be granted for energy-efficiency measures that are profitable for the society, but not 
profitable for individual persons and corporations. This goes for buildings as well as industry. 
Energy certification will make sense only if the societal gains exceed the costs entailed in 
issuing the certificates. Hence, certification should be implemented as a market measure 
without extensive and costly advisory procedures. Norway’s energy-efficiency strategy fits 
rather very well with this view on ambitiousness: an ambiguous target, cost-efficient Enova 
supports scheme for industry as well as individuals, and energy certification designed as a 
market measure.  
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Again, we see that Denmark, France, Germany and the UK compete for the best ranking 
along the Technology Development dimension. Target-setting, technology-specific state aid 
and energy certification designed as a consultation/advice measure fit with high ambitiousness 
along this dimension. We find few differences among the countries as to energy certification, 
with the exception of the Green Deal in the UK, which promotes energy performance 
consultation and explicitly combines it with a support measure. Germany stands out as 
particularly earnest and ambitious, with its detailed targets and extensive state aid. Denmark 
and the UK are close behind, and get a shared silver medal in this category. They have less 
specific targets than Germany, but have ambitious policy portfolios in line with the 
Technology Development approach to ambitiousness: Denmark has high taxes combined 
with detailed regulations, and the UK has developed an ambitious Green Deal programme 
that combines state aid with encompassing consultation services. Overall, France seems less 
dedicated than the three other countries.   
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5 Conclusions 
How and to what extent can the climate policies of the six European countries studied here be 
said to be ‘ambitious’? Table 4.2 summarizes the scores of the six, along three dimensions of 
ambitiousness. This ranking is not based on absolute, quantifiable figures: the positions of the 
countries will always be open for discussion and reconceptualization. All the same, a rather 
clear comparative pattern emerges 
Table 5.0 Ambitiousness Profiles: Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, UK  
 Market Minimizing 
Societal Costs  
Technology 
Development 
Average rating 
(exact average 
position)** 
Denmark   2nd  + 2nd + 1st + 2nd 2nd (2)Technology 
development 
France   3rd + 4th + 3rd + 3rd  3rd (3.25)Technology 
development 
Germany   1st + 3rd 1st + 1st 1st  (1.5)Technology 
development 
Norway 1st (1st)* 1st+1st+1st   1st (0.75)Minimizing 
Societal Costs 
Sweden 1st +1st+1st (1st)* 1st   1st (0.75) Market 
UK   1st + 1st + 2nd + 2nd 1st (1.5)Technology 
development 
Leading country SWEDEN  NORWAY UK  
Sources: own data.  
*The emission reduction objectives of Norway and Sweden were given top ranking on both the 
economic dimensions, but in order to prevent double counting this top ranking is counted only once, 
along the minimizing societal cost dimension, and is presented in brackets in the market dimension.  
** The figures in the bracket have been produced by adding the rankings for every country and dividing 
by the number of sub-issues that are explored (4). The lower the figure, the better positioned the 
country is in terms of the dimensions on which it has been ranked.  
 
First, we note that the countries tend to design their climate policies in line with the 
technology development approach: this is the dominant approach in the Danish, German, 
British and French climate policy profiles. The UK and Germany are the leaders of this group, 
with exactly the same ranking. Germany scored as the most ambitious in three areas, but 
ranked only third when it came to emissions regulation. The UK leads the group on 
emissions-reduction targets (together with Germany) and on emissions regulations, while 
scoring as number two in the other areas. Somewhat surprisingly, the UK ranks as the leading 
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country with respect to technology development – a few years ago, its climate policy was more 
dominated by market thinking. Germany and the UK are closely followed by Denmark, which 
ranks as number two in most issue-areas, but is number one, together with Germany, on 
renewable energy. France has a significantly lower position: in all issue-areas it emerges as the 
least ambitious country when assessed in relation to technology development criteria.  
Since the UK used to be the main European promoter of market measures it is particularly 
interesting to note that now it ranks so high on the technology dimension. The past five years 
have seen a radical shift in British climate policy, away from market measure dominance and 
towards technology development. True, the UK has developed some measures that fit with 
the two other dimensions, but these are not dominant in any of the four sub-categories 
assessed here. Hence, the UK is ranked consistently in accordance to the technology 
development dimension, where it comes out first in two out of four categories. Note, 
however, that Germany and Denmark rank above the UK as regards renewable energy –a 
particularly important sub-issue within the technology development view on climate policy.  
In both Denmark and Germany, climate policies are essentially energy system transformation 
projects, and also the UK has taken substantial steps in this direction. For Denmark and 
Germany, GHG emission reductions are important, but that is not the primary guiding 
principle: their long-term commitments to renewable energy are climate policy objectives in 
their own right. The UK pays more attention to GHG emissions than Denmark and 
Germany, with national carbon budgets as the main steering mechanism. Still, the UK’s 
climate policy strategy is just as nationally focused as the Danish and German strategies, and 
the UK is more engaged in costly energy-efficiency measures than the other leading 
technology development countries. The technology development approach to climate change 
has received increasing criticism lately, especially in Germany but also in the UK. However, 
this has not led to any significant recent shifts in policy.  
Second, Norway emerges as a clear climate-policy winner as regards the Minimizing Societal 
Costs dimension. With the exception of Sweden, it is also the only country that is ranked in 
accordance with this view on climate policy ambitiousness. There are elements of this thinking 
in Denmark as well, but neither Denmark nor Sweden is close to Norway when it comes to 
the dominance of this approach to climate policy development. Interestingly, during the last 
decade, Norway has introduced various measures that clash with ‘minimizing societal cost’ 
thinking – such as a green certificate scheme for renewable energy, energy certification of 
buildings, aid measures for energy efficiency administered by the State Housing Bank, and the 
ban on gas power without CCS. Many of these measures have been influenced by EU climate 
policy – but, since Norway is the only country in this ‘class of competitors’, it emerges as the 
winner.  
It may be argued that it is ‘natural’ for the UK, Germany and Denmark to pay more attention 
to transforming their national energy systems than Norway, as they need to move away from 
fossil fuels (and nuclear power in Germany) while Norway already has almost 100% renewable 
electricity production. However, it is striking that Germany, whose economy is based on 
industries that rely on fossil fuel and nuclear power, is actively seeking to change its industrial 
structure, while Norway, whose economy is based on petroleum production, has no aims in 
that direction. Germany wants to transform its industry and energy production through 
technology development, whereas Norway has focused on using economic instruments that 
reduce emissions but have little impact on the structure of its industry. Norway aims to apply 
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its financial resources in a way that can maximize emission reductions, and pays less attention 
to long-term transformation of its national industry-energy system.  
Third, Sweden emerges as a clear leader along the market dimension: it ranks as number one 
in this dimension in all sub-areas, although sharing this position with Norway in one instance. 
Moreover, Sweden also has elements of the two other dimensions in its climate policy 
strategy. Swedish climate policy was initially more aligned to the technology development 
approach, but the market approach has been in focus lately. The market dimension and the 
‘minimizing societal cost’ dimension have a range of commonalities, so Sweden and Norway 
have more in common with each other than with the other four countries studied here. 
Interestingly, Sweden has moved in a market direction under a Conservative government, 
while the reverse has been the case in the UK.  
Fourth, this assessment shows that ambitiousness in climate policy can be defined in many 
different ways. How countries are ranked will depend largely on which criteria are used. The 
countries assessed in this report do not develop their climate polices independently of each 
other: they are all covered by EU climate policy and may be influenced by each other. This 
report has shown that that even though the ‘cornerstone’ in EU climate policy, the ETS, is a 
market measure, many other measures are in keeping with the technology development 
approach. If the EU fails to change the ETS rules in a way that can lead to higher carbon 
prices, feed-in schemes may become the motor in the European climate transformation 
project.  Hence, there is reason to expect an increasing level of conflict between Norwegian 
and EU climate policies.  
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